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Saskatchewan 2024: 
Making Change Happen 
Introduction and 
Executive Summary 
This panel was constituted by the Provincial 
Council of the Saskatchewan NDP 
following the October 2020 provincial 
election. The panel’s mandate and tasks 
were defined by the following resolution: 
“That the Saskatchewan NDP will conduct an 
external, comprehensive review of the 2020 
provincial election outcome with a dual focus on 
both the root causes of the result, and solution-
based recommendations to prepare for the next 
election. The review will be inclusive of 
stakeholders and will review structure, processes 
and election preparation. 
“The report will assess strengths and weaknesses 
and provide actionable recommendations for the 
coming four years of building toward the next 
campaign. The review will inform a strategic plan 
for the future and will be reviewed operationally 
on a regular basis by executive and council. The 
results of the review will be provided to the 
Provincial Council before the next Provincial 
Convention. The review panel will be led by 
Gerry Scott, with four additional members to be 
elected by Provincial Council.” 
In addition to Gerry Scott (chair), four panel 
members were elected by the Council: Judy 
Bradley, Modeste McKenzie, Craig Scott 
and Brian Topp (brief biographical notes on 
the panelists are at the end of the report). 
In laying out our work plan, we paid special 
heed to Provincial Council’s focus on “root 
causes” and the need for “solution-based 
recommendations.” Accordingly, we took 
the perspective that, while assessing the 
2020 campaign was important, equally 
important was the task of examining trends 
that arose in the years since we were last in 
government. We also very explicitly sought 
advice from everyone we met with on the 
changes and improvements that they felt 
were needed to bring electoral success. 
We began our work in December and in 
January and February we interviewed and 
met with people throughout the province, 
including MLAs, former MLAs and 
ministers, 2020 candidates, trade union 
representatives, constituency associations, 
representatives of the party wings and 
committees, campaign staff, and other 
activists from a variety of backgrounds. 
We conducted 45 interviews with 
individuals, 16 regional constituency 
meetings with 61 constituencies represented, 
five meetings with trade unions and the SFL, 
and seven sessions with internal party bodies 
such as the wings.  Through two mass 
emails we also sought input from all 
members, volunteers and donors that were in 
the party’s central database. We received 
and reviewed 320 individual and 
constituency written submissions. 
We thank all of the members and 
organizations who made submissions and 
particularly those who met with us.  We also 
want to thank Samira Wagner who provided 
valuable staff support to the panel 
throughout this process. 
We have heard a wide range of opinions 
about the past and the future, and we have 
attempted to assess all of the information in 
a balanced way to bring forward both the 
most common themes and the ideas for 
change that we feel have the most potential 
to support victory in 2024. 
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The panel heard from many about how 
much Saskatchewan has changed in the past 
couple of decades. Fewer and much larger 
farms; more urbanization; more polarization 
on social and political issues including 
Indigenous relations; Saskatchewan’s 
increased economic reliance on oil and gas; 
the rise of right-wing populism; fundamental 
changes to the media; the evolution of a 
basic two-party system; and a precipitous 
drop in voter turnout. 
It is important to note that, while most of our 
discussions focused on the challenges of 
recent years and the need for change going 
forward, we also heard a lot of praise. Many 
members felt they had seen a well-run, 
professional campaign; a strong Leader’s 
debate performance; a strong Leader’s tour; 
a truly diverse slate of candidates; increased 
supports for local campaigns; successful 
fundraising; and excitement and pride in a 
renewed caucus of thirteen energetic MLAs, 
including eight female MLAs, three 
Indigenous MLAs and a re-elected Leader 
(the first since 2007). Generally speaking, 
the campaign itself was not seen by most as 
the biggest challenge, although areas that 
need improvement were certainly identified. 
But that does not mean these results were in 
any way acceptable to the members of the 
Saskatchewan NDP with whom we spoke. 
We were solidly defeated for the fourth time 
in a row. Members feel strongly that a lot 
about our party must change. 
But most participants felt that the most 
important challenges that the Saskatchewan 
NDP faces go far beyond what was done or 
not done in the most recent 28-day 
campaign period. 
Many submissions highlighted the 
challenges we have specifically faced in 
recent elections in rural constituencies. 
Members feel that strong action is required 
to address those challenges – beginning with 
a strong response to the attacks on the 
records of the Romanow and Calvert 
governments. 
Many also noted that there are too many 
working families either not voting or 
supporting the Saskatchewan Party (SP) 
conservatives because, in their view, we 
have not connected strongly enough on jobs, 
working people’s experiences, their fears of 
income insecurity, and pocketbook issues 
generally. 
Many stressed the declining voter turnout in 
recent elections and challenged us to address 
the need to reach non-voters, including the 
many Indigenous people who relate more 
strongly to federal politics. 
Importantly, many activists also told us that 
internal reforms are needed to connect 
members and supporters more effectively 
with the central party and caucus, to ensure 
two-way communications are strengthened, 
and to engage our supporters in more active 
ways year-round and not just at election 
time. 
Since the 2007 election when we lost power, 
the Saskatchewan NDP has suffered from 
internal turnover, disappointments of losses, 
decline of our rural base, leaders losing their 
own seats, and conflicts on issues such as 
climate and energy. Despite diminishing 
public enthusiasm for the SP conservatives, 
they have been left in office as a result of 
these factors and our failure to fully 
capitalize on their failings. 
At the same time, the SP has abused their 
position in order to brand their party, 
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Saskatchewan’s provincial government, and 
this province as essentially one and the 
same. They have also deployed vastly 
superior financial resources for year-round 
campaigning. 
We want to again stress that our present 
situation did not arise just since the last 
election cycle of 2016-2020. Most of the 
factors that we describe in this report have 
been developing over the past 15 to 20 
years. 
We must grapple with major, longer-term 
issues. Getting them right is vital if the NDP 
is to rebuild and become truly competitive to 
win the 2024 election. 
The NDP way is to get the job done. When 
in government, the NDP has, time and again, 
got down to work, whether it was erecting 
the stable foundations of Saskatchewan’s 
social, economic and physical infrastructure 
from Tommy Douglas through Allan 
Blakeney or whether it was the Romanow 
and Calvert governments picking up after 
the rampant criminal corruption and 
economic incompetence of the Grant Devine 
Conservatives - the parents of today’s SP 
conservatives. 
It is again our challenge to persuade the 
people of Saskatchewan to give us the 
chance to prove our competence in leading 
transformation of the economy.  The burden 
is indeed on us. It is for the NDP to set out 
the plans and inspire the trust of the people 
of Saskatchewan, to show them that not only 
did we get the job done successfully in the 
past, but we will get the job done again. We 
need to stimulate the drive and skills of 
Saskatchewan’s people to tackle the 
challenges we face, not just as they appear at 
present but also as they will take shape in 
the future. 
The Saskatchewan NDP is the party that 
built a fiscally sound, prosperous and 
environmentally responsible Saskatchewan -
but we must also remind and persuade 
voters of that fact. 
It is the party that has the vision and the 
competence in government to steer 
Saskatchewan toward where (to paraphrase 
a great Canadian) the puck is going to be, 
not where it is now. 
Our major recommendations in brief: 
First, we need to change the way we do 
our political work. 
We must conduct four-year, 365-days-a-
year campaigns, as elections are not 
usually won or lost in the official 28-day 
campaign period. 
Our caucus and party must aggressively 
prosecute the record, competence, ethics 
and priorities of the current government. 
If we don’t have a problem with the 
government, the public won’t either. 
The Saskatchewan NDP must 
aggressively challenge our opponent’s lies 
and distortions about our record in office. 
In the eyes of too many former supporters, 
we are currently disqualified from office 
because we have unwisely chosen not to 
answer those attacks.  
We need to speak directly to the principal 
concerns of working families in the 
province – their jobs, their economic 
security, and their future in a resource-
driven economy that is facing changes 
driven by global forces.  
And the Saskatchewan NDP needs to re-
assume its role as this province’s 
strongest and most effective national 
advocates, after a long period of the 
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province punching far below its weight in 
the federation under “Saskatchewan Party” 
premiers rightly viewed as lightweights by 
their peers on the national stage. When 
necessary, that includes fearlessly standing 
up to the federal NDP when it is wrong on 
Saskatchewan’s provincial issues. 
Second, our party itself needs to change 
and improve, on a number of fronts. 
Among them: 
• Active outreach to build relationships 
with Indigenous Peoples and diverse 
communities throughout the province. 
• How the party and its campaigns are 
governed. 
• The candidate nomination process. 
• The platform and policy process. 
• Our network of constituency 
associations, especially in rural 
communities. 
• Fundraising and expansion of other 
party-building capacities 
• Internal and external 
communications. 
Few political parties have a deeper talent 
pool than the Saskatchewan NDP – but 
much of it has been sitting on the bench. It is 
homecoming time for all members and 
supporters of the Saskatchewan NDP, from 
every generation. 
Few parties have prouder records. It’s time 
to be proud, and to say so – while speaking 
to today’s issues with, and for, a new 
generation of people with new ideas. 
And few parties in opposition face such an 
unsuccessful, fiscally irresponsible, corrupt, 
and poorly led opponent – an opponent with 
such a troubling past they changed their 
name to hide it. It’s time to hold them 
accountable, 365 days a year. 
People all across Saskatchewan – urban and 
rural, young and old, Indigenous peoples 
and newer Canadians – know that the time is 
coming to end the drift, dithering and 
failures of this province’s current 
government. 
It’s time for a change in Saskatchewan. 
But before the people of Saskatchewan will 
trust us to change this province, they need to 
see us change. Change what we present to 
them; and change how we operate as a party. 
That is what this report is about. 
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Part 1: Results 
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(1) Eligible voter turnout in Saskatchewan elections 
has declined. 
Participation in Saskatchewan elections, traditionally high, dropped abruptly in 
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(2) The NDP is struggling to rebuild its caucus. 
The NDP’s rise and fall since 1982 involved sweeping city and suburban seats 
(1986) and then rural ones (1991) – and then surrendering these gains in reverse 
order. The NDP has a strong and resilient provincial core vote but has not been 
able to grow beyond it for four cycles. 
Election NDP vote Caucus Outcome 
1982 37.6% 9 Opposition (Blakeney) 
1986 44.6% 25 Opposition (Blakeney) 
1991 51.0% 55 Majority (Romanow) 
1995 47.2% 42 Majority (Romanow) 
1999 38.7% 29 Minority (Romanow) 
2003 44.6% 30 Majority (Calvert) 
2007 37.2% 20 Opposition (Calvert) 
2011 32.0% 9 Opposition (Lingenfelter) 
2016 30.4% 10 Opposition (Broten) 
2020 31.6% 13 Opposition (Meili) 
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(3) A regional breakdown tells a more complex story. 
The Party’s northern vote is quite resilient - but not to be taken for granted. 
Our urban and suburban vote has been steadily recovering since 2011 and is in 
sight of the numbers earned during winning campaigns, although the suburban gap 
remains a challenge. 
Our rural vote held respectably throughout our last term in government (2003-
2007), but rural communities are now where conservatives are piling up their 
largest pluralities (the riding-by-riding details of this chart are set out in Appendix 
B). 
1978 1982 1986 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2016 2020 
North 58.7% 51.8% 58.0% 82.3% 57.3% 76.7% 69.8% 62.7% 63.5% 63.5% 61.7% 
Four cities 53.7% 40.7% 55.7% 58.4% 56.1% 47.1% 52.5% 45.0% 39.4% 40.7% 44.6% 
Urban.core 54.0% 41.5% 57.3% 61.0% 59.9% 50.4% 57.3% 50.1% 44.4% 46.3% 49.8% 
Suburbs 50.3% 35.0% 43.4% 44.7% 39.6% 32.4% 34.7% 26.2% 21.2% 29.0% 33.7% 
Northwest 43.6% 31.9% 37.6% 42.7% 40.6% 38.8% 37.8% 31.8% 26.5% 18.9% 16.6% 
Northeast 52.1% 41.8% 44.0% 50.1% 42.7% 35.3% 38.9% 31.0% 25.1% 22.8% 21.1% 
Southwest 35.7% 29.1% 30.9% 32.5% 27.9% 19.4% 23.3% 16.0% 12.2% 15.3% 15.4% 
Southeast 40.8% 34.2% 36.2% 44.5% 38.8% 27.3% 35.9% 26.2% 21.8% 17.5% 17.4% 
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(4) Conservatives enjoy a massive fundraising 
advantage during and between elections, fueled by 
corporate donations. 
The former Devine Conservatives retook power in 2007 powered by over $3 
million in corporate donations - over 60% of the funds they raised that year - and 
have been generously funded by corporate supporters in Calgary and in-province 
every year since. 
The official financial numbers displayed in the chart below, published by Elections 
Saskatchewan, likely significantly understate the funds available for recent 
conservative campaigns, given the growing role of rightwing dark money and 
third-party entities. 
The NDP has benefited from corporate and trade union donations, especially 
during election years, but is in no way financially competitive against its SP 
conservative opponent under current fundraising rules. Since 2007, the SP has 
raised over $27 million more than the NDP. 
NDP SP SP Advantage 
2006 1,715,234 1,406,475 -308,759 
2007 2,289,818 4,794,646 2,504,828 
2008 941,494 1,364,442 422,949 
2009 1,171,000 1,697,903 526,803 
2010 1,342,431 3,932,775 2,590,344 
2011 2,096,988 6,113,499 4,016,511 
2012 956,597 3,267,950 2,311,353 
2013 1,177,515 2,680,215 1,502,700 
2014 408,542 2,731,762 2,323,220 
2015 1,326,180 4,264,353 2,938,172 
2016 2,398,419 5,740,052 3,341,633 
2017 1,321,915 2,937,599 1,615,684 
2018 1,320,315 2,714,418 1,394,103 
2019 1,354,521 3,405,067 2,050,546 
Total 19,821,069 47,051,155 27,230,086 
(It should also be noted that political fundraising reports in Saskatchewan hide as much as they reveal. 
For example, reports blend corporate donations with campaign loans. The vulnerability to out-of-
province funders; the dominance of out-of-province corporate donations to the governing party; and poor 
reporting and accountability were corrected long ago in other provinces) 
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(5) Party membership has steadily declined since its 
peak in 1991. 
The historical membership numbers below are not complete, but there is no 
question that numbers in recent years are far below the party’s peak membership. 
Membership Note 
1991 45,000 Peak membership 
2003 16,600 Provincial election year 
2007 8,600 Provincial election year 
2009 13,200 Leadership race 
2010 10,200 
2011 9,000 Provincial election year 
2012 8,200 
2013 11,000 Leadership race 
2014 7,600 
2015 6,400 
2016 5,300 Provincial election year 
2017 7,600 
2018 14,100 Leadership race 
2019 8,000 Provincial election year 
Page | 13 
Part 2: Why These results? 
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(1) The so-called 
“Saskatchewan” Party 
proved to be a loyal 
pupil of the NDP. 
The current government was launched as a 
tactical merger of the Progressive Conservative 
and a portion of the Liberal caucuses in the 
Legislature - creating a vehicle to pool 
Conservative and Liberal votes, the traditional 
means to unseat the NDP in Saskatchewan. 
This new entity then set out to “out NDP the 
NDP”. They aimed to disqualify the NDP in the 
eyes of voters in the same manner the NDP had 
succeeded in disqualifying the Conservatives of 
Grant Devine – and deployed a massive 
fundraising advantage to do so. 
This continuation of the Devine regime in 
another guise has been as successful as it is 
brazen. 
It has appropriated the province’s name and 
provincial colours, in the same way that 
Quebec’s Parti Québécois and other ethnic 
nationalist and rightwing parties have done 
around the democratic world – an attempt to 
signal that true citizens of this province must 
support the conservative record and policy. 
It created a false-front vehicle, the 
“Saskatchewan Party'', to allow senior figures 
from the Devine Conservative government to 
return to provincial politics without being held 
accountable for their conduct in office. That 
included Brad Wall (in his early public career a 
talented rightwing populist before his real face 
eventually emerged). 
And it elected a government that learned a few 
things. Returned to office, the conservatives 
have been stealthier and more incremental. For 
example, they have been hollowing-out and 
contracting-out the province’s Crown 
Corporations, instead of trying to sell them. And 
they have regularly made symbolic gestures to 
hold the traditionally Liberal vote they acquired 
when they merged with a portion of the Liberal 
caucus. For example, the government recently 
implemented an insurance rebate suggested by 
the NDP caucus. 
But, unfortunately, a $2-billion-and-counting 
public tendering scandal and a public debt 
heading to $30 billion demonstrate that the 
current government learned neither to keep their 
fingers out of the public cookie jar nor how to 
count. 
The police investigations and prosecutions that 
flowed from the last conservative round in office 
ruined many lives and careers. Some figures 
committed serious crimes. Others were 
prosecuted for trivial violations (for example, 
one elderly Conservative MLA ended his career 
with a tearful apology to his grandchildren in the 
legislature, after being caught using his MLA 
allowances to buy a saddle for rodeo parades in 
his constituency). 
The conservatives’ recovery from this utter 
discredit and ruin; their careful study of what 
made the Saskatchewan NDP successful; their 
ability to learn and adapt; and their 
determination to win - all this has generated a 
remarkable if improbable political chapter in 
Saskatchewan’s colourful history. The Devine 
Conservatives figured out how to return to 
office. 
To turn the page on that chapter, the 
Saskatchewan NDP needs to find the same 
energy and determination within itself. 
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(2) Our approach to 
opposition has not 
disqualified this 
government. 
The NDP, some argue, has been an overly 
“nice” opposition. In the view of many party 
activists who spoke to us, in recent election 
cycles the NDP has chosen a relatively polite 
and unduly ‘reasonable’ approach to both the 
conservative government’s glaring scandals and 
its policy failures. “The NDP is playing nice and 
gentlemanly and being kind,” a former candidate 
told us. “The rules of politics are otherwise.” 
If we do not have a problem with the 
government, why should the public?  
It bears saying that this may be too simple. 
The NDP under Dwain Lingenfelter mounted a 
ferociously negative campaign aimed at 
profiling Brad Wall’s troubling history as a 
senior official in the Devine government. Mr. 
Lingenfelter was himself then politically 
disqualified for being “too negative”. 
Cam Broten energetically profiled the SP’s 
corruption in office, including the Wall 
government’s still-to-be-investigated multi-
billion scandals and gross fiscal mismanagement 
during a commodities boom. Mr. Broten too was 
disqualified for being “too negative”, notably 
during the 2016 leader’s debate. 
As we can see from the CBC Saskatchewan poll 
tracker set out above, the Saskatchewan NDP 
caucus mounted a relatively effective opposition 
between 2016 and 2018, exploiting serious 
mistakes by the conservatives. 
The caucus avoided tangling with the still-
popular Premier Wall and instead focused on 
vulnerable ministers, whose many weaknesses, 
suitably profiled, were beginning to persuade the 
public to reconsider the wisdom of rehiring them 
to run the province – and were also beginning to 
persuade voters to question the premier’s 
judgement. 
The caucus emphasized the need for a better and 
more effective focus on jobs and the economy. 
They profiled the government’s record of 
“mismanagement, scandal and waste” – 
repeating that line until the public was beginning 
to hear it. And they responded effectively to a 
grossly unpopular budget. 
Caucus members told us they could see they 
were connecting with the public during this 
period. Their arguments started to be repeated 
back to them by citizens at increasingly well-
attended urban and rural public meetings. Mr. 
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Wall’s “reveal your real face” final budget 
confirmed much of what the Saskatchewan NDP 
was saying.  
And then the “Saskatchewan Party” switched to 
a new leader, softened some of its unpopular 
budget provisions and - as if coated in Teflon -
successfully turned the page. The NDP gains 
were reversed. 
Therefore, a glaringly weak, tired and 
incompetent Saskatchewan Party ministerial 
team; the need for a forward plan for jobs and 
the economy instead of running up the 
province’s credit card during a commodities 
boom; conservative mismanagement, scandal 
and waste; and Scott Moe’s troubling issues of 
character and competence were not top of mind 
for voters by 2020. They needed to be, for the 
NDP to have a shot at winning the election. That 
is still true today. 
The departures from cabinet of Bill Boyd and 
Joe Hargrave, driven out by public anger 
over their lapses, are proof that determined 
NDP opposition tactics can pierce the SP 
armour. Governments can be, and are, defeated 
by their mistakes, their misguided priorities, 
their neglect of people’s needs - if the opposition 
skillfully and relentlessly attacks and exposes 
those misdeeds in ways that connect with the 
public. Simultaneously, we must draw a sharp 
contrast by effectively communicating our offer 
to Saskatchewan voters. Those are the key tasks 
ahead. 
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(3) The NDP decided not 
to respond to the 
conservative framing of 
its record. 
In April 2021, NDP MLA Aleana Young 
engaged in a memorable exchange with 
Jeremy Harrison, who is (as she likes to say) 
the worst economic development minister in 
Canada -- a typical minister of the current SP 
government. Young pointed out that the SP 
government’s obsessive attacks on health 
policy implemented thirty years ago is an 
attempt to deflect from their own record – 
and is aimed at an NDP team who were 
schoolchildren at the time. 
Some of our caucus then posted photos of 
themselves so that voters in Saskatchewan could 
see who the government was attacking. Here 
they are above. Points for correctly identifying 
everyone. 
A couple of observations on this: 
First, the NDP caucus is the future. They are a 
team of bright, energetic, and highly capable 
MLAs. They are broad cross section of people 
with new ideas. Which is what Saskatchewan 
will need after four terms under a tired, 
expended, incompetent, corrupt and innumerate 
government led by ministers like Mr. Harrison. 
Second, as we will discuss below, this exchange 
is what this team of Saskatchewan New 
Democrat MLAs are capable of -- and owe 
voters: a determined, on-point, memorable and 
witty opposition that connects with voters. 
Conservatives have weaponized a caricature of 
health policy implemented thirty years ago to 
deflect debate and to avoid accountability for 
their own record over the past fourteen years. 
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Millions of dollars’ worth of unanswered 
conservative attack ads has been deployed over 
four election cycles around a populist rightwing 
“big lie” about health policy in Saskatchewan. 
What is the substance of this? 
The former NDP government’s 1992 and 1993 
budgets were designed by the late Ed 
Tchorzewski – Finance Minister at the time, a 
principled New Democrat and career 
schoolteacher, clear in his mind that he was 
proposing temporary economies to save public 
services from bankruptcy after the last period of 
conservative mismanagement, corruption, and 
waste. 
Many measures were hotly debated, but this 
approach overall enjoyed wide public support 
and led to the government’s re-election with a 
majority in 1995. The NDP then remained in 
office for twelve more years. 
● On health care, almost all facilities at issue 
remained open, arguably in more effective 
roles. The “Saskatchewan Party” certainly 
thinks so, since not one has been restored as 
a “hospital” during the current 14 years of 
SP rule. 
● By saving the province from the near 
bankruptcy brought on by conservatives 
when they were last in office, the 
Saskatchewan NDP saved our hospitals and 
health facilities throughout the province. 
The current government sometimes rolls school 
closures implemented in the 1990s into their 
messaging. 
• Thirty years ago, school closures were 
decided by division boards based on 
enrollment and viability, not by the 
provincial government. 
• But things are different now: school closures 
are now effectively decided by Mr. Moe’s 
conservatives, since the SP during their 
current stint in office stripped school boards 
of a great deal of their autonomy by 
removing local division taxing authority. 
These unanswered attacks by our opponents 
have damaged a key part of our party’s 
brand – our role as founders and sustainers 
of medicare. 
As we have seen, many of our current MLAs 
and candidates were in grade school thirty years 
ago. And many of them told us they were 
intensely frustrated to be held accountable by 
our political opponents for a cartoon of policies 
implemented when they were children and 
teenagers. But many candidates, especially in 
rural ridings, nonetheless told us that these 
themes were successfully weaponized by the SP 
and dominated their exchanges with too many 
voters. 
Why weren’t these attacks rebutted effectively? 
In the view of many party activists we spoke to, 
in recent election cycles the NDP consciously 
chose not to respond to this multi-million dollar, 
determined and long-term effort by its political 
opponents to deflect attention from their own 
record. The NDP did this on the theory that it 
should not do battle on the issues chosen by its 
opponent, that “when you’re explaining you’re 
losing”, and that these issues are “ancient history 
no longer relevant with the passage of time”.  
Our election results over the past three cycles 
suggest this was unwise – and that an effective 
response like the one mounted by our caucus a 
few weeks ago would have served us better 
during recent election campaigns. 
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(4) The NDP has too 
often missed voters’ 
deep concern about 
jobs. 
The party has been too light on jobs and 
people’s concerns about their economic 
security, the principal concern of many 
voters. The Saskatchewan economy has been 
built on resource development and on 
agriculture. In recent election campaigns the 
NDP has accepted the erroneous perception that 
conservatives are more credible on economic 
issues, and that the party should focus on health 
and public services in its campaigning because 
of our relative strength in those areas compared 
to the SP. This has left the Saskatchewan NDP 
(which, unlike most other NDP provincial 
sections, oversaw the construction of the 
provincial economy for most of its postwar 
history) not persuasively addressing the 
principal concern of most voters – their jobs and 
their economic future.  
The NDP caught it in both ears on what it did 
campaign on. The NDP set out in recent 
election cycles to contrast itself with the 
government by “putting people first” – 
proposing to invest in public services, while 
conservatives cut services. The SP conservatives 
counterattacked the investment proposals by 
asking “how will this all be paid for?” In the 
view of several activists speaking to us, this was 
the only line in the 2020 leader’s debate that 
stuck with voters, despite what almost all who 
spoke to us felt was a strong performance by 
Ryan Meili. 
The conservatives also countered our attacks on 
their past and future cuts successfully, by re-
litigating the NDP’s 1990s health reform, 
without effective rebuttal. In this way, the 
government politically had its cake and ate it 
too, simultaneously attacking the NDP for 
claimed reckless spending to come and for past 
cutting of spending. Both sides of this attack 
were repeatedly and simultaneously put to our 
canvassers by voters at the door in 2020 (“How 
will you pay for all this?” alongside “The NDP 
can’t be trusted because you cut spending”). 
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(5) Too many working 
people no longer see the 
NDP as their party. 
Since 2007 there has been a growing disconnect 
between working people and our party.  This is a 
trend impacting social democratic parties 
throughout the industrialized democracies from 
Australia to Europe to North America. In our 
meetings many views were offered on this 
concern:  perceptions that we no longer support 
resource industries, economic development, and 
new jobs; the perceived federal NDP role in the 
Liberals’ minority Parliament; too much focus 
on marginalized communities; fears of 
“expensive” policy proposals with tax increases; 
and the factors noted in points 1-4 above. 
Of note was the most common message given to 
us by trade union leaders, candidates and others: 
that we are perceived by too many potential 
supporters as detached from their economic 
concerns, Saskatchewan’s development and the 
need for more good jobs. 
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(6) The NDP has been 
marginalized and vilified 
in rural Saskatchewan. 
Many of our party’s campaigners in rural ridings 
told us they faced a hostile atmosphere in rural 
Saskatchewan, created by over a decade of 
unanswered negative campaigning from the SP 
conservatives. 
Some candidates reported being aggressively 
vilified and harassed at the doorstep and on the 
street. Supporters in some communities were 
reluctant to take signs out of concern they and 
their families would be retaliated against by 
neighbours. Voters repeated lines verbatim from 
unanswered conservative attack ads at the door.  
In some areas, candidates were reluctant to stand 
until just before the campaign period, to 
minimize their exposure. 
For too long, we have allowed this decline of 
our rural base - a base we have built our party on 
since the 1920s. We have seen a drop in 
membership, less active communications and 
engagement with supporters, and a growing 
disconnect with economic and social changes. 
The party has failed to fully deal with the 
changes in agriculture, the growing 
proportion of workers in many smaller cities 
and rural communities, and the changing 
needs of those communities. 
In consequence, an important and growing 
portion of rural working-class voters are 
aligning with conservatives. 
With the concentration of agriculture into the 
hands of a relative handful of landowners, most 
people in rural Saskatchewan have become 
resource workers, waged agricultural workers, 
service sector employees, or public sector 
employees – as a former leader told us these are 
“all natural NDP constituencies”.  Yet, many 
rural working-class families believe the SP over 
the NDP. 
Why? 
A strong majority of people in rural 
communities have been persuaded to fear a 
return to NDP government, on the SP claims that 
the party seeks a quick end to the oil and gas 
industry, and places environmental goals ahead 
of mining, forestry, and other resource 
development. This is a too-common perception – 
that we are threatening the industries that have 
provided rural Saskatchewan with hope, with 
capital, with new jobs, and with an economic 
future after farming transitioned to its current 
form.  
In a number of rural ridings, the newly formed 
separatist “Buffalo Party” competed for votes. 
Although this new party is probably of greater 
concern in the long term to the conservative 
government than to us, its ability to appeal to 
working class voters underlines the price the 
NDP is paying for failing to sufficiently address 
the core concern of these voters – their jobs and 
economic future. 
The work of the Agriculture and Rural Life 
Committee (ARC) is a welcome change in the 
right direction for our party and is providing 
hope that more engagement and better 
organization can change our fortunes in rural 
Saskatchewan. 
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(7) The COVID Pandemic 
helped the government. 
As the pandemic progressed throughout last 
October, there were opportunities for us to 
effectively expose the government’s response 
shortcomings and that was done. But with case 
counts low until almost E-Day, those challenges 
were not that salient for most voters (in line with 
other provincial campaigns in British Columbia 
and New Brunswick, where incumbent 
governments also had the advantage).  As we 
have all seen the situation has changed 
dramatically after E-Day. 
But with the COVID restrictions in place, there 
were many downsides for us in terms of 
mobilization and organization, particularly with 
volunteer and staff recruitment and with voter 
turnout. Many First Nations were in complete 
lockdown at various critical periods. The 
curtailment of door-to-door canvassing for 
several months is another key example, but just 
one of many important impediments to our 
ability to actively campaign and mobilize 
constituency teams. 
Too many voters in our universe of potential 
supporters were either relatively satisfied with 
the situation due to the low number of COVID 
cases before the second wave hit, or they stayed 
home and did not vote because they feared 
contact with other people. 
The various limitations on door knocking, phone 
banking, Leader’s tour events, constituency 
meetings and other group activities all had the 
same impact of limiting our profile, our contact 
with voters, and our momentum.  These factors 
all helped a stable, incumbent government. 
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(8) Too many people saw 
us addressing too many 
issues. 
Our interviews often brought out strong opinions 
that the full written platform and the campaign 
messaging were trying to deal with too many 
issues, for too many different audiences. 
Frequently, the same folks who said this to us 
often added that the platform should have also 
included one more key item! 
That tendency is a trait that we are all guilty of.  
But often it does not lead to effective 
connections with people who are looking at us to 
deal with core issues such as jobs, their family’s 
economic security, health care and education.  
Most voters are usually not interested in a long 
list. 
Often, a long list triggers concerns regarding 
possible tax hikes. Those are concerns that we 
must fully anticipate and address with solid 
information about who is really carrying the tax 
load under Scott Moe’s SP regime.  
Our core campaign messages must speak to 
voters’ top priorities, based on our values and 
theirs. The campaign’s communications 
emphasis simply cannot include everything 
that is in the platform itself. 
At the same time, we almost always need a 
platform to outline, in somewhat greater detail, 
our goals for changes in the event that we are 
chosen to form a government. 
Therefore, the panel sees the challenge as 
balancing the campaign’s day to day 
communication focus on core issues with the 
development of a platform that speaks to voters 
more broadly on a wider range of issues and 
concerns that may be more specific and perhaps 
more localized. While that balance in 2020 was 
not always achieved in the eyes of many we met 
with, the panel also recognizes that the platform 
was also addressing the important strategic goal 
of showing the contrast between our 
commitments and the record and priorities of our 
conservative opponents. 
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(9) Voters want us to 
stand up for them, 
regardless of federal 
party politics. 
Many Saskatchewan New Democrats told us 
that the federal NDP has reinforced the 
provincial party’s problems on economic issues 
and made it more difficult to connect with 
working class voters in both urban and rural 
seats. In their view, the federal party has not 
been effective at defending itself or counter-
attacking its conservative opponents in this 
province. 
In the result, the federal NDP’s positions on 
resource development and energy infrastructure 
(including proposed pipelines in prairie 
provinces) have damaged the provincial party’s 
brand and political prospects in Saskatchewan. 
In the last election cycle, the federal party’s 
support for the federal government’s carbon tax 
was also profiled by our conservative opponents, 
as were the federal party’s confidence votes in 
Parliament. 
The federal party’s handling of Erin Weir, a 
federal Saskatchewan MP, also concerned some 
of the members who spoke to us. 
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(10) Conservatives have 
successfully targeted all 
of the NDP’s post-
government leaders. 
The SP conservatives have used their 
fundraising advantage to personally discredit 
three successive NDP opposition leaders. 
Elections in good part are referendums on 
leaders. Conservatives in Saskatchewan 
understand this well and have focused much of 
their fundraising advantage on discrediting a 
succession of NDP leaders since the party went 
into opposition in 2007. Here again 
conservatives are repaying the NDP in its own 
coin – the NDP won in 1991 by 
comprehensively discrediting the Devine 
regime; the NDP won the 2003 election in good 
part by seizing on a gaffe made by SP leader 
Elwin Hermanson and discrediting him. Favours 
that have been returned with interest over the 
past four election cycles. 
NDP campaigns have neither successfully 
defended their leaders, nor responded effectively 
to the cards that were thus dealt. A number of 
activists speaking to us noted that the 
conservative playbook of personally targeting 
whoever leads the NDP is now entirely 
predictable and needed a much more effective 
response. 
High turnover in the leadership meant less 
effectiveness for the party.  Since 2007 the NDP 
has had six permanent and interim opposition 
leaders and leader’s staff teams. Dwain 
Lingenfelter served until 2011, John Nilson until 
2013, Cam Broten until 2016, Trent 
Wotherspoon until 2017, Nicole Sarauer until 
2018, and now Ryan Meili – on average, a new 
acting or permanent leader every 26 months. 
This has, in many ways, served the conservative 
government very well indeed. 
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(11) The collapse of 
Saskatchewan’s media 
strongly benefits the 
government. 
Rowing against hostile media is nothing new for 
the Saskatchewan NDP – but the state of the 
media in the province has become a matter of 
urgent public interest. 
The province’s former newspapers (the “Sifton 
press”) were once among the party’s most 
formidable and obsessed adversaries. Tommy 
Douglas countered them by speaking to voters 
directly on radio. 
Those newspapers are now shadows of their 
former selves. Saskatchewan’s daily newspapers 
were strip-mined by American vulture fund 
investors. Their community advertising, 
newsrooms and readership then collapsed. Their 
role as the voices of communities here in 
Saskatchewan was discredited by front-page 
partisan political editorials written for them in 
Toronto. 
Commercial radio and TV newsrooms are a 
thing of the past – radio’s contribution to 
provincial politics is now the partisan views of 
an American-style right-wing talk radio host 
who is an unembarrassed former Conservative 
MP and a political intimate of the current 
government. Press Progress recently reported 
that the dominant corporate owner of 
Saskatchewan’s radio stations 
(Rawlco/Rawlinson) donated over $300,000 to 
the SP conservatives between 2006 and 2018. 
The CBC could compensate. But conservatives 
understand this, and obsessively attack the 
public broadcaster in the same manner Donald 
Trump railed against independent accountability. 
The current national conservative leader 
proposes to close the CBC television network if 
elected. The present Liberal government in 
Ottawa for reasons of its own has not corrected a 
long period of defunding, and in consequence 
the CBC’s local news efforts and audiences have 
eroded. 
Only community weekly newspapers retain a 
healthy relationship with their audiences. 
None of this is a positive development. It has 
almost emptied the press gallery in the 
provincial legislature. This has resulted in the 
shrinking of detailed coverage, investigative 
enquiry and serious commentary on provincial 
politics and public issues, notwithstanding the 
efforts of a handful of hardworking survivors. 
That is entirely to the benefit of the incumbent 
conservative government, which now governs 
with little independent public accountability. 
Getting to this point is why today’s 
conservatives throughout the western world 
obsessively attack the “fake news” media even 
when, in their editorial sections, the same outlets 
are often servile enablers of conservative rule. 
Populist, Americanized modern conservatives 
like the ones operating on the Canadian prairies 
do not want objective professional journalists or 
nonpartisan commentators enquiring into their 
doings on any terms. 
We note a pattern of message alignment: 
At election time in recent cycles, there is a 
notable alignment between some of the content 
circulated by the SP war room, dark money 
third-party conservative groups, at least one 
Conservative MP using House of Commons 
mailing privileges, and the province’s media. In 
the 2020 election, for example, the aligned 
message was that the election would be about 
holding the NDP accountable for its 1990s 
record in office, at a time when many of the 
NDP’s candidates were schoolchildren – a 
theme concurrently reinforced in the SP’s “big 
lie” attack ads. 
Leaders’ debates are sometimes an opportunity 
for a challenger to equalize a money advantage 
by their opponent. Jack Layton, for example, 
vaulted into official opposition in 2011 with the 
help of a well-framed debate performance. 
Rachel Notley solidified her victory in 2015 in 
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Alberta with a sparkling debate performance. To 
suppress this risk, on the day after the 2020 
Saskatchewan leader’s debate, in which Ryan 
Meilli performed well, the province’s major 
newspapers focused on a political poll they had 
fielded before people had heard the debate – 
largely ignoring the public interest in the issues 
debated, and helping the conservatives suppress 
any effect the debate might have had on public 
opinion. 






(12) The party withered 
in power and further 
withered in opposition. 
The NDP failed to tend to its grassroots, and so 
they too have withered. Periods in power can be 
opportunities for a political party to build out 
and to stock up for an inevitable future period in 
opposition, as the party did in Alberta under 
Rachel Notley. That did not happen here. 
Instead, the party withered in office. Many 
constituency associations lost their ability to 
function without an MLA, and as the caucus 
shrunk, so did the party at the local level. The 
withering of the party can be seen in many ways 
– notably in its political, membership and 
financial results, outlined in the tables above. 
A few other elements worth highlighting: 
Our repeated, lengthy leadership races 
sapped the party of its focus and 
resources. 
Party executives and organizers across Canada 
have bought into the myth that long leadership 
races provide political parties with an 
opportunity to grow their membership and 
fundraising base. The Saskatchewan NDP is an 
excellent demonstration of the folly of this. 
Lengthy internal warfare over leadership 
exhausts political leaders and activists; builds 
internal tensions and division; wastes 
fundraising resources on internal campaigning 
and debate; and produces too many one-time 
members and one-time donors who do not renew 
after the leadership convention is over. Long, 
paralyzing internal leadership debates are 
exactly what our conservative opponents 
wanted, and we obliged. 
The party unwisely failed to reform 
political fundraising rules while in office, 
perhaps because the corporate sector 
provided the party itself with relatively 
generous contributions. 
But as the overall fundraising numbers show, 
corporate donors in and out of province are 
prepared to fund conservative governments 
much more generously, particularly between 
elections. 
As a result, while the NDP has managed to put 
together somewhat reasonable budgets during 
election years, it sometimes collapsed into 
relative inactivity between elections. The 
conservatives have been generously funded 
every year and have massively outraised the 
NDP, every year. 
To survive as a legislative party, the NDP 
focused its relatively meager financial 
resources on winnable ridings in cities. 
This meant, in essence, ceding a majority of the 
province to the conservatives for over a decade 
with the results we see. 
Internal party meetings frustrated and 
demobilized members and deterred new 
recruits. 
Very few of the activists we spoke to believe 
that the party’s meetings and governance inspire 
new members, build political momentum, or 
play any meaningful role in its key decisions. 
As is the case in many sections, our conventions 
are now paralyzed by procedural disputes and 
agenda debates – which are often the visible sign 
of efforts by the party to sideline unwisely-
drafted policy motions that would feed the 
narratives of our political opponents. 
Thus, like leadership races, conventions in their 
current form have become an expensive 
instrument to further erode the party rather than 
to build it. 
Many members feel that party 
membership has been reduced to 
receiving fundraising emails. 
Without accessible, regular, and meaningful 
ways to participate in political activities between 
elections, party membership in the 
Saskatchewan NDP has, in the perceptions of 
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many, largely become an opportunity to receive 
a torrent of daily provincial and federal 
fundraising emails – and an invitation to help 
with canvassing, once every four years. It is a 
remarkable tribute to the determination of the 
Saskatchewan NDP’s membership that almost 
10,000 of them endure this and retain their 
cards, hoping for better days. 
But while waiting for those better days, the real 
work of organizing, candidate recruitment, 
fundraising, local campaign planning, 
community outreach and recruitment, and 
community policy development has increasingly 
fallen to a corporal’s guard of constantly 
changed central staff, small local volunteer 
teams, and then to a relative handful of out-of-
province campaign workers working in ridings 
for a few weeks at election time. 
Our results underline that this must change. 
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(13) Blending the work of 
the Agricultural and 
Rural Life Committee 
(ARC) with the central 
campaign and the 
platform was only partly 
successful. 
As noted in many of our meetings, ARC 
represents a vibrant example of grassroots 
member initiative and hard work - one to draw 
strength from going forward. Considering cross-
over memberships on Provincial Council, ARC 
has a significant voice in the current governance 
of the party.  In the rural context, the 2020 
election cycle was distinguished by the proactive 
efforts of ARC to prod party thinking about 
policy that would speak, from the perspective of 
ARC’s dozens of members, to the needs and 
future of rural Saskatchewan. There were also 
ARC communications initiatives (such as op eds 
in local papers).  
ARC also made good use of technology to 
bring together people spread around the 
province to arrive at collaborative agreement 
around policy recommendations, to connect 
on matters of common interest, and to offer 
mutual support - even before Zoom became a 
household word after COVID-19 broke out. On 
the latter (mutual support) front, the Panel heard 
from a good number of rural candidates who 
were grateful to ARC and specific ARC leaders 
for support online as they struggled with both 
campaign logistics and the challenges of facing 
considerable hostility in some rural areas. These 
efforts paralleled considerable support provided 
to candidates by the Saskatchewan New 
Democrat Women wing as well as the guidance 
and support for rural candidates that the central 
campaign team was able to provide. 
In 2019 and 2020, ARC representatives worked 
through various party processes to influence 
decisions on policy and platform and developed 
significant written submissions such as a 
document entitled Healthy Communities. While 
it is not possible to document the extensive back 
and forth exchanges, it is important to note that 
there was frustration and concern that the 
perspectives offered by ARC were not fully 
embraced in the central decision processes.  
In the context of a tradition of grassroots 
activism in the Saskatchewan CCF and NDP and 
of a desire to help the party reconnect with rural 
Saskatchewan, ARC and Provincial Council 
members were working from the perspective of 
democratic engagement in policy development.  
The central party and campaign team needed to 
integrate this with the purposes and realities of 
election platform formulation.  A platform is the 
entry-point for an election communications 
strategy that increases the chance of striking a 
chord with voters in a way that produces 
winning campaigns. Platforms also provide a 
framework for the civil service to develop 
ministry by ministry plans for an incoming 
government, especially when an opposition 
party replaces the incumbent.  A lot of research, 
consultation, expert policy judgment and 
strategic political judgment must come together 
in the decisions made around the content, 
presentation and roll-out of a platform that 
contains good policy based on accurate data, is 
fiscally sound, and is likely to produce the 
outcomes desired. 
The Panel often heard from those who were not 
ARC members just how much ARC’s work and 
grassroots spirit was deeply appreciated, even as 
it was felt by some that ARC had some 
unrealistic expectations of how detailed a 
platform should be on specific issues, including 
energy and climate protection.  We also heard 
from some that they felt the ARC proposals 
reflected “more NDP gospel than rural realities”. 
The ARC efforts to influence policy and the 
response of the central team should not be 
viewed in isolation. These were not the only 
policy consultations in which the central team 
was involved and the general challenges of 
developing an effective platform affected the 
central campaign’s relations with ARC. 
Alongside ARC’s participation, it is important to 
note that, this time around, there was 
Page | 31 
considerable engagement (perhaps notably the 
Battlefords conference in 2019).  As well, the 
platform team also made diligent efforts to meet 
with all sitting MLAs. 
In that regard, it is important to know that ARC 
efforts were listened to. In terms of ARC’s 
initiatives in writing and placing op eds articles 
and leaflets, the campaign welcomed these in 
general terms. As for platform impact, it seems 
likely to the Panel, for example, that ARC’s 
advocacy around rural telecommunications 
connectivity was a factor in its inclusion in the 
platform, even if it did not receive as much 
emphasis in the campaign as hoped for. That 
said, many – including from urban ridings – 
expressed concerns to us that there was simply 
not enough rural content and strategy in the 
platform and campaign. 
ARC’s efforts tell a story of democratic energy. 
Even as many rural riding associations were 
struggling to meet campaign demands, the 
province-wide ARC was there - and will 
continue to be there - to put rural Saskatchewan 
more firmly on the party’s political map. Their 
outreach methods and their person-power are a 
solid foundation on which to build, as new and 
much-needed rural strategies and actions are 
developed. 
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(14) Our voter universe 
has shrunk and so has 
turnout: both help the 
conservatives. 
As shown by the figures in section 1 of Part 1, 
the percentage of eligible voters who come out 
to vote fell off a cliff in 1995, dropping to 57% 
from the 77% turnout in 1991. It has since then 
only crept above 60% once, and that was 60.8% 
in the change election of 2007 when the 
Saskatchewan Party conservatives first came to 
power. Since 2007, the vote has hovered close to 
50%: 51.1% (2011); 53.5% (2016); and 52.8% 
(2020). 
It is worth noting that conservatives do better 
when voter turnout is lower.  Before the 2020 
election, publicly available polling did indeed 
reveal that a significant percentage of 
Saskatchewan voters, well beyond 50%, had 
tired of the SP and had no particularly strong 
loyalty to, let alone affection for, the party. 
It seems likely that a slice of those voters was 
presumptively still going to vote SP in 2020, but 
did want the SP to be counterbalanced by a more 
numerous Opposition because a range of 
concerns had developed in their minds. Internal 
polling data suggests a considerable number of 
others were potential switch voters to the NDP 
at the start of the election. 
Even though overall voter turnout was down 
by only 0.7% in 2020 as compared to 2016 
(and indeed up by 1.7% from 2011), that 
number could well represent the difference 
between the Saskatchewan NDP having won 
the 13 seats it did and taking an additional 
three to eight if we had been more successful 
in getting out the vote in those ridings lost by 
a small number of votes. 
One can always muse about this after an 
election, and sometimes it is clear that efforts 
left nothing on the table and there were simply 
no more votes to be found. However, the Panel 
believes that COVID hesitancy and a general 
lack of motivation from some clearly identified 
supporters to vote on election day (perhaps 
caused in part by polls that may have made 
voting feel beside the point) were salient factors 
in those close ridings. 
Beyond the handful of close ridings, however, it 
would be a stretch to say that election turnout 
was a particular factor for this election any more 
than for all the elections with reduced turnout in 
recent years.  In general, failure of most 
potential switch voters to stay in the 
Saskatchewan NDP voter universe by the end of 
the election reflects the general factors, 
discussed throughout our findings, that have 
caused the NDP to lose voter share at the same 
time as low turnouts have become the norm.  
Of great significance to Saskatchewan’s future is 
the relatively low turnout in many Indigenous 
communities (impacted significantly by COVID 
lockdowns in this election). While we must 
never take for granted that Indigenous voters 
have a strong preference for the NDP, our 
positions on a range of issues do justify saying 
there is far more affinity between the NDP and 
Indigenous voters’ values and interests than the 
Saskatchewan Party. With three very capable 
Indigenous leaders as MLAs in the new caucus, 
alongside many energetic Indigenous activists 
and the 2020 election’s Indigenous candidates, a 
strong foundation for strengthened engagement 
is in place. 
We also know that Saskatchewan is changing. 
More newcomers are coming in. The province is 
getting younger. Inequality is growing and has 
been deepened by COVID impacts. Suburban 
women can be expected to show increasingly 
limited patience with the reactionary 
conservatism, machismo, and poor role models 
that plague the SP conservatives. Indigenous 
people are becoming a larger and larger share of 
the overall population. Too many workers have 
drifted away from us, but there is much room for 
the NDP - the party of working people - to do 
the hard work of winning back a big chunk of 
that vote, in partnership with trade unions and 
other allies.  All these changes open possibilities 
for higher voter engagement and turnout, but 
only with strong actions from the NDP. 
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(15) Party resources and 
capacities are 
inadequate to bring 
victory. 
There has been an absence of internal party 
renewal and re-organization since the 2007 
defeat, even as there has been a lot of change in 
Leaders, senior staff, and MLAs.  We see 
evidence of a ‘missing generation’ of activists, 
constituency leaders, and election staff as the 
recruitment, mobilization, training, and 
mentoring required for renewal in various 
capacities just did not occur at sufficient levels 
between 2007 and 2020.  
Pre-election preparations in 2020 did not 
overcome the challenges of the point above as 
there is a significant gap between the needs and 
the capacities. That is, the party is not meeting 
the needs for more constituency organizing and 
communications support, for Indigenous 
organizing, for outreach to communities and 
social sectors, for rural organizing, and for 
advertising between elections, to name just 
some. We need more resources, more trained 
and experienced staff and volunteers, more 
strategic planning, and more funding.  These 
gaps further illustrate the need for increased 
activity at all levels in the years between 
elections, including expanded fundraising and 
membership. The 2020 campaign also 
demonstrated that there is a need for tighter 
communications between the central and the 
constituency campaigns about responsibilities 
and roles of each level in terms of specific 
campaign components. 
Of particular importance is the party’s 
capacities in the world of online campaigning. 
In principle, digital campaigning could be an 
equalizer, balancing the conservatives’ out-of-
province and corporate fundraising 
advantages. While 2020 saw a much improved 
and expanded digital campaign overall, more 
can and must be done going forward. As well, 
there must be very close alignment between the 
central online activities and those at the 
constituency level, with early and shared 
planning, significant training, clear reporting, 
and larger budgets at both levels before and 
during the election campaign. 
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(16) Youth involvement 
in the party has 
declined. 
Throughout the history of the NDP, across 
provincial sections and federally, youth 
members have been crucial to the party’s energy 
and generational rejuvenation. A significant 
number of active constituency leaders, party 
staff, and MLAs have, over the years, entered 
the Saskatchewan NDP through Youth Wing 
membership and activities. 
The Panel spoke to a number of NDP members 
in their late teenage years and in their twenties. 
Apart from the SYND representatives, young 
people were part of many of the Panel’s group 
sessions and spoke often and with keen 
observations. 
There was much evidence of young people 
playing essential roles as campaign volunteers, 
as campaign staff, and indeed as candidates. 
This was more obviously the case in urban 
ridings as the volunteer core of most rural 
ridings are in their 60s and onward. This does 
not mean youth were absent in rural campaigns 
— indeed, a good number of impressive rural 
candidates were younger. 
At the same time as many youths are active in 
the party, there is a consensus that youth 
involvement is considerably less than 
historically the case. Campus clubs have gone 
defunct, with new efforts to revive them now 
underway. The Youth Wing reports that it is 
treading water, with limited integration into the 
overall affairs of the party and with limited 
success in attracting new members. It is worth 
noting that the Youth Wing has a special 
replenishment challenge as compared to other 
wings - youth do not stay that way and age out, 
and many younger adults tend not to identify as 
“youth.” 
Of serious operational concern is the gradual 
diminishment of staff opportunities for youth, 
which is a key source of experience and 
inspiration for short- and long- term 
involvement (a smaller caucus and smaller party 
means fewer opportunities). There does not 
appear to be a concerted, province-wide effort to 
recruit younger activists for organizational roles 
and to develop mentorships for key positions 
such as campaign managers. 
In comparison to other periods, there also has 
been a limited number of Saskatchewan youth 
gaining campaign experience in other provinces. 
The number of ridings in Saskatchewan 
compared to population makes it difficult to 
always have youth in key roles in every 
constituency.  But it appears that this challenge 
has been worsened by a missing generation or 
two of organizers due to fewer young New 
Democrats becoming activists in recent years. 
We were told several times by younger New 
Democrats that their generations are 
increasingly best understood as doers not 
joiners. They will join a protest or solidarity 
event, or organize an event, as an active 
commitment to values or a cause — such as 
climate change, standing up for the struggles 
signified by #BlackLivesMatter, or bringing 
attention to Indigenous suicides. 
Less and less do they find satisfaction in simply 
joining a party, especially if, as more than one 
youth noted, they think that party membership 
equals “meetings” versus “action”. NDP youth 
are encountering this recruitment challenge and 
the central party has not acted to systematically 
counteract this decline, although the summer 
intern program has been a critical and successful 
step in that direction. The gaps in youth 
recruitment, involvement, training and 
mentorship are significant and must be more 
fully addressed. 
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(17) The process of 




Various aspects of the overall process of 
nominating and vetting candidates and of 
approving nomination meetings were criticized 
by many of the members that we interviewed. 
Much of the criticism arises from conflicting 
understandings about what the centre should be 
managing and what are the responsibilities of 
constituencies in terms of candidate 
nominations.  Some of this divergence arises 
from the grassroots traditions of the CCF and 
NDP colliding with newer dynamics that have 
arisen with more polarizing campaigns, social 
media, and greater influence of ‘big media’ 
compared to local constituency media outlets. 
The criticisms the panel heard are addressed in 
the recommendations we make, and those are 
guided by the overriding need for close 
alignment between the centre and the 
constituencies with respect to the nomination 
process.  They cannot be in conflict and must be 
addressed early to avoid that. 
The main concerns raised were: 
● too many candidates were nominated too 
late; 
● the vetting process and criteria were not 
clear enough and there was no appeal 
process; 
● the considerations behind the scheduling of 
nomination meetings by the EPC and the 
Provincial Executive was not always fully 
communicated and/or understood by 
constituency executives and candidates for 
nomination, and those considerations were 
often seen by local activists as more 
properly to be a constituency decision; 
● the provincial party’s policies and strategies 
to seek diversity within our candidate slate 
were not always fully communicated and/or 
understood by constituency executives and 
candidates for nomination and were often 
seen as more “central interference”, rather 
than as an ongoing provincial policy that 
had been widely discussed and accepted 
over the years at conventions.  
There are some important strategic issues 
that justify what the party was trying to do in 
terms of nominations: 
• The party was seeking to present a slate of 
candidates that was gender-balanced and 
diverse - and succeeded; 
• People who are interested in standing for 
public office are typically talkative on social 
media, and political war rooms feast on 
unwise posts to undermine opposing 
campaigns. Candidates’ backgrounds are 
part of the party’s credibility.  Through the 
vetting process the party needed to 
understand its risks when determining 
whether to allow a candidate to represent it. 
We just need to recall the NDP’s 2016 
campaign challenges, the media coverage 
and the SP’s successes in that regard to 
appreciate the need for thorough vetting and 
serious consideration of candidate 
approvals; 
• Timing of nomination meetings is part of a 
provincial strategy, not just a local 
constituency decision.  Other criteria such as 
local candidate search, membership levels, 
voter contact activities and fundraising 
targets are linked with timing as part of the 
provincial strategy; 
• In principle, filling a slate with enthusiastic 
but often low-profile local activists prevents 
the party from finding nominations for 
higher-profile candidates who would not be 
able to campaign as NDP candidates until 
closer to the writ – local mayors and 
councilors, for example. 
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Although we believe the party was acting for 
valid reasons, we must report that many activists 
believed that the late nominations in particular 
left them dead on arrival during the campaign, in 
many rural areas. Certainly, the opportunity cost 
was very great. Too many of our constituency 
associations folded over the past 20 years as 
they lost their MLAs and after the SP took 
power.  Dropping candidates into local 
campaigns a week or two before the writ was the 
cherry on the cake with respect to the issues 
discussed above – increasing the chance of 
failure and defeat. 
A final critical point: in recent cycles, few 
candidates who lived this experience remained 
engaged after the election to build their 
constituency associations. 
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(18) The bottom line: We 
did not materially 
improve on our 2016 
vote. 
This was so even though the 2020 NDP 
campaign was well-managed by its central 
campaign staff, we seemed to be generating 
positive momentum in public domain polls 
and we had many strong local campaigns. 
In many ways, 2020 was a good campaign for 
the Saskatchewan NDP: many members 
volunteered that the most recent campaign was 
the best-managed, smoothest run and most 
supportive campaign they had seen in recent 
memory. Others disagreed. 
Senior staff reported that they worked well 
together as a team, got along, executed the tasks 
they were assigned effectively, and were proud 
of their work. Many ridings observed they were 
much better supported than in recent campaigns.  
Many constituency campaigns had stronger 
efforts than in other elections and we gained 
vote share in many of those.  However, that was 
not a fully consistent trend despite great efforts 
by candidates, trade union allies, staff and 
volunteers. 
Losing two to one hurts. But these results are not 
rooted in the effort or the hours put in by 
campaign staff, most of whom were given only 
months or weeks to contribute to the effort. 
Many staff members reminded us that public 
domain polls and a good deal of media 
commentary suggested that the Saskatchewan 
NDP was going to be erased from the 
Legislature or reduced to a rump in this election, 
during a COVID epidemic that strongly 
favoured incumbent governments of all stripes. 
Instead, the party held its ground, its caucus, and 
its vote, and re-elected its leader for the first 
time since 2007.  We have several new MLAs 
and a caucus that has eight women and three 
Indigenous MLAs. 
Members of this panel have seen far worse 
results. For example, a BC election that reduced 
the NDP (currently back in government) to two 
seats. Our Quebec campaigns in the not too-
distant past celebrated increases in votes from 
1% to 2%. 
Now is a time for all friends of the 
Saskatchewan NDP to return to our work. And 
for hard work to be thanked – like the work of 
our 2020 campaign team led by director Trevor 
McKenzie-Smith, caucus chief of staff Adrienne 
King, and provincial secretary John Tzupa; the 
efforts of all our candidates; support from the 
trade union movement; the sacrifices of our 
legions of constituency organizers and 
volunteers; and of course, the generous support 
of our donors. Some campaign managers and 
senior campaign staff even joined this work 
from out-of-province – these party colleagues 
spent many long nights far from home to help 
the party in Saskatchewan. They, and all our 
team, deserve our thanks for the effort they put 
into this campaign. 
It is also true that measured by the final vote 
itself and burdened as it was by the deep and 
long-term issues outlined above, the party did 
not materially improve on its 2016 result. 
• The SP conservatives received 61.12% of 
the vote, a 1.41% decrease from 2016. 
• The NDP received 31.82% of the vote, a 
1.52% increase from 2016. 
• We lost good incumbent MLAs and other 
constituencies that we have frequently held 
in the past. 
Public domain polls over the course of the 
campaign reported a small bump in voting 
intentions as voters assessed the respective 
leaders’ tours, debate performances, paid 
advertisements, digital messages, and local 
campaigns. But that did not translate at the ballot 
box overall – remembering that, as we showed 
above, the party is recovering its vote in urban 
and suburban constituencies and holding our 
strong leads in the far North. 
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It can be credibly argued that this campaign did 
achieve an important strategic goal – the 
Saskatchewan NDP avoided being wiped off the 
map, in an election in which its opponent got 
61% of the vote. We have a more well-known 
Leader, a very credible new caucus and a solid 
base vote. 
But what political parties in official opposition 
owe voters is a compelling prosecution of the 
incumbent government and a presentation of a 
credible alternative government. Political parties 
should not be playing for bronze, they should 
play to win. 
That is particularly true here. The 
Saskatchewan NDP is the cathedral of social 
democracy in North America – the seedbed of 
much of what Canadians think of as the heart 
of their citizenship. 
It is time to wipe the mud off our record, flung 
at it by a tired, incompetent, corrupt and 
increasingly bankrupt conservative government. 
It is time to speak clearly and directly to the core 
issues that working families care most about, 
whether in urban, suburban, Indigenous or rural 
communities. 
And it is time to correct internal mistakes that 
distract us from this work. The party has a deep 
well of talent and support in the province, much 
of which has been sitting out recent cycles. It is 
time for homecoming – of all of the friends of 
the Saskatchewan NDP. 
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Part 3: Recommendations for Change 
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(1) We need to match the 
SP’s permanent 
campaign with our own. 
We Recommend: 
(1.1) A campaign for four years to match the 
SP’s permanent campaigning: we must 
recognize that we cannot win in just 28 days or 
even 28 weeks.  This approach requires more 
resources, planning, work, and imagination to 
make our actions and our smaller budgets more 
effective.  Happily, our activists want to be more 
active in political action - and not just for 28 
days but more regularly.  So let’s harness that 
energy where it is most needed: taking our 
issues to the people as often and as effectively as 
possible.  
(1.2) Critiques of government corruption and 
failures by the Leader and MLAs must be 
strongly reinforced and supported by party 
activities and resources to take those messages 
directly to people.  At all levels of the party we 
must ramp up grassroots communications, voter 
contact, and community engagement to make 
our criticisms stick and disqualify the SP, just as 
the NDP did when Grant Devine was the 
premier.  This would include social media work, 
Coffee Row communications, leaflet 
distribution, canvassing, letters to editors, call-in 
shows, etc. 
(1.3) A digital strategy that is state-of-the-art, 
effectively implemented, and nimbly adjusted as 
lessons are learned.  This is especially crucial as 
a strategy for connecting with, and across, the 
geographically spread-out ridings of rural 
Saskatchewan and the increasingly diverse 
communities in urban and suburban 
constituencies. Importantly, such digital 
campaigning must go beyond one-way flows of 
information and include genuine interactive 
engagement with our members, with those most 
clearly in our voter universe, and with the people 
of Saskatchewan as a whole. 
(1.4) We suggest the party relaunch The 
Commonwealth as a regular e-magazine. We 
suggest “Coffee Row” be relaunched as a 
regular source of information and political 
talking points. We suggest a weekly email with 
party news, without a word of fundraising 
content. Our goal is to develop party 
membership that is more than fundraising 
emails, with more political information flow, 
more opportunities for feedback, opportunities 
to campaign between elections, and social events 
that are not for fundraising such as coffee 
parties, MLAs’ reporting sessions and pub 
nights. 
(1.5) Rebuild around strong constituency 
associations, strong campus clubs and strong 
wings, including a plan for strong central 
organization and outreach activities that utilize 
the 2021 summer interns, the 2020 local 
organizers, volunteers, MLAs and the 2020 
candidates to establish the NDP profile and 
organizational foundations in the maximum 
number of constituencies in all regions. 
(1.6) A strategic plan for nominations that 
takes into account local and provincial candidate 
search, earlier nominations, diversity of 
candidates, timely vetting, and candidate support 
and training. Use the nomination process as a 
key tool to strengthen constituency building and 
growth. (see also Recommendation 11) 
(1.7) Expanded and systematic community 
outreach by the Leader and MLAs to strengthen 
connections and relationships with businesses, 
Indigenous communities, agricultural producers, 
multicultural communities, trade unions, 
women’s organizations, students, LBGTQ and 
Two-Spirited groups, seniors, disabled 
organizations, and others. 
(1.8) The priorities of the provincial office 
should also reflect the ‘permanent campaign’ 
model, with ongoing efforts to streamline 
administration and to maximize the focus of 
staff time and resources on front line 
campaigning. 
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(1.9) A major focus on identifying a new 
generation of organizers for intensive training 
and on-the-ground experiences, as soon as 
possible.  
This can include the successful summer intern 
program, elections in other provinces, 
constituency-level voter contact activities, and 
specialized skill-building workshops (including 
at the October convention and at Council 
meetings).  This investment now is needed to 
increase between-election political action and to 
provide learning experiences in the years ahead 
of the 2024 election. 
(1.10) Systematic skills development and 
capacities expansion with increased mentoring, 
training, campaign experience, and ongoing 
voter contact activities between elections, 
including more support for our volunteers such 
as training in delivering our messages, safety 
measures (particularly for women, Indigenous 
people and minorities), recognition for their 
efforts, and sharing of strategies in inclusive 
ways. 
Finally, we need to respond to the collapse of 
Saskatchewan’s media. 
We recommend: 
(1.11) That in all communications we do all that 
is possible with what is left of the mass media. 
Treat serious reporters with the respect they 
deserve.  Expand the Leader’s and MLAs’ 
engagement with weekly newspapers and other 
community media outlets. 
(1.12) That we invest more resources, time 
and energy in talking directly to voters: go 
into broadcasting with lots of podcasts, videos 
and creative (and strategic) social media, 
involving innovative young activists in many 
languages and many communities. Fresh minds 
and a new approach to message modes and 
methods are required 
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(2) The current 
government needs to be 
held accountable. 
Our caucus and party should aggressively 
prosecute the record, competence, ethics, and 
priorities of the current government. 
New Democrats do not always take naturally to 
opposition politics. People typically get involved 
in the Saskatchewan NDP to advocate for a 
better deal for ordinary people and to improve 
public services like health and education. But 
politics is necessarily adversarial. Opposition 
parties play a critical accountability role in 
legislatures. And successfully prosecuting an 
incumbent government is a necessary 
preliminary to defeating it. 
If we do not have a serious problem with the 
“Saskatchewan Party” government, why should 
the public? 
Disqualifying the current government must 
therefore be a principal focus of our caucus and 
our party. 
A public party report is not the place to blueprint 
detailed legislative strategies but it is appropriate 
for us to report the unanimous view of every 
party member who addressed this matter during 
our discussions: our party needs to take the fight 
to the SP government and show that we intend to 
replace them by doing our job as the official 
opposition with clarity, focus and determination. 
It is unusual to defeat a government in a 28-day 
campaign. Governments in Saskatchewan are 
typically defeated in detail over the full course 
of their final term, and that is what needs to 
happen to the current government during the 
current term. 
To illustrate, look at how our current team 
aggressively took on the 2021 government 
budget, and the government’s dismal record 
managing COVID. 
We recommend: 
(2.1) We urge clarity, focus and fierce 
determination in revealing and profiling the 
current government’s corruption, fiscal 
mismanagement, dithering, failures on the 
national stage, and weak Premier and cabinet 
team. 
(2.2) The Leader’s and MLAs’ core messages 
should be circulated broadly and rapidly 
within the party following provincial budgets, 
significant legislation and other key decisions in 
a few easy-to-share communications products 
(leaflets, social media, op-ed articles, etc.). The 
Provincial Executive and senior staff should 
develop a work plan for ongoing outreach and 
communications that involve all levels of the 
party in grassroots communications and voter 
contact with these core messages. 
(2.3) We also recommend the caucus and 
party keep fighting to end the rule of “big 
money” in Saskatchewan. Political donations 
should be limited to individual voters who live 
in Saskatchewan, like almost every other 
province in Canada. 
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(3) We must confront the 
Saskatchewan Party’s 
“Big Lie” about our 
record. 
The Saskatchewan NDP must challenge our 
opponent’s lies and distortions about our 
record in office. 
There is room for debate about the fiscal, 
economic, and social records of the Douglas, 
Lloyd, Blakeney, Romanow and Calvert 
governments. But there is no room for debate 
about the CCF-NDP’s history on health care. 
Our party founded medicare; built it; 
successfully maneuvered in the national 
Parliament to make it a national right of 
citizenship; and then saved it in Saskatchewan 
from the reckless fiscal irresponsibility of 
Devine’s Conservative government - now back 
in office, their hands once more in the public 
cookie jar, and the provincial debt once again 
out of control. 
• Hospitals and health centres in 
Saskatchewan were saved from the 
consequences of the province being brought 
to the brink of bankruptcy by the Devine 
Conservatives - the parents of today’s SP. 
• In the fourteen years it has been back in 
power, the “Saskatchewan Party” has not 
converted a single rural health centre into a 
“hospital”. By their deeds they support these 
centres in their current roles. 
That our record on these issues has been 
successfully muddied by the same people who 
fought public medicare tooth and nail; then 
bankrupted it; and now angle for its privatization 
is a testament to the power of the “big lie” in 
politics. And it is a testament to what happens 
when you choose not to answer claims by your 
political opponents. As recent events in the 
United States demonstrate, populist rightwing 
parties no longer fear trafficking in falsehood, 
and what they say is widely believed – if what 
they say is not challenged. 
We recommend: 
(3.1) The Saskatchewan NDP needs to tackle 
the “Saskatchewan Party” on these issues. 
Our caucus is off to a good start doing so, as we 
discussed above. Calling out the SP 
government’s big lie on medicare needs to 
become an issue of their character, and their own 
conduct in office. What else are they lying 
about? What is it about their own term they do 
not want exposed or debated? 
(3.2) In support of this work, this might be a 
good moment for our party to take stock of its 
own history and real record. We recommend 
staging an important segment of the coming 
NDP convention to review and celebrate over 
75 years of achievement under the Douglas, 
Lloyd, Blakeney, Romanow and Calvert 
CCF/NDP governments.  As well, a carefully 
considered information package should be 
provided to new and existing members of the 
party, to help them confidently rebut our 
political opponents’ distortions and to take the 
fight to them. 
(3.3) More generally, we recommend finding 
ways to restore pride and rejuvenate the 
‘happy warrior’ side of the NDP – a tone we 
welcome in our new caucus. For example, the 
party should provide a welcome kit for new 
members that highlights the NDP’s history, 
record, values, and readiness to lead 
Saskatchewan into the future. Just as the 
convention will do, welcome packages will 
facilitate team building, linking our past 
achievements to present and future actions. In 
our proposals on party communications set out 
below, we urge other ways to provide every 
NDP supporter with the real facts and the 
confidence to use them from coffee row to the 
lunchroom to Facebook. 
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(4) We need to reconnect 
with working class 
voters. 
Based on our meetings with trade union 
representatives and many activists and 
candidates in constituencies, it is clear that we 
need to strengthen our connections to working 
people and to Saskatchewan’s trade unions as 
frontline representatives of working people. 
We recommend: 
(4.1) Speak directly to working class voters, 
more often and about more of their priorities. 
While this seems very obvious, we believe it is 
worth stating explicitly because too often, we 
were told in many of our meetings, including 
those with trade union representatives, that the 
NDP is perceived to be talking to ‘somebody 
else’ and not enough to working class and 
middle-class families. 
(4.2) Connect with people through their 
workplaces, unions, industries, and work-
related activities. In other recommendations we 
reference the many ways of reaching out to more 
people through organization and 
communications. These steps and others 
referenced in this report can bring us closer to 
the everyday working families, with a great 
diversity of backgrounds, that are the majority of 
Saskatchewan residents. 
(4.3) Increase communications and 
collaboration with trade union allies, build 
stronger relations and greater cooperation in 
areas of shared interest, and work with them 
as active participants in our goal of ‘the 
permanent campaign’. This would include 
party representatives learning more about their 
industries, their workplaces, their concerns, and 
their ideas for developing more political 
involvement of their members. This would 
include caucus outreach to develop priority 
issues and to reach more working families where 
they are at, in cooperation with their unions. 
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(5) We need to squarely 
address the future of 
resource industries. 
We observe that fossil fuel will remain a 
significant energy source for many years, but its 
growth rate is declining throughout the industrial 
world.  In that light, Saskatchewan must lead in 
greater diversification, energy innovation, 
energy efficiency and in provincial policies for 
climate protection. The ground is shifting in the 
Saskatchewan business community, as 
demonstrated by the March 17, 2021, milestone 
report by the Saskatchewan Chamber of 
Commerce, Building the Low-carbon Economy: 
Exploring Opportunities and Challenges for 
Saskatchewan. 
We believe that the Saskatchewan NDP must 
present itself as the party that forward-thinking 
business leaders will want to engage, in 
preference to the SP conservatives, who are 
joined at the hip with the federal Conservative 
Party.  The Conservatives just showed at their 
national convention that its all-controlling base -
alongside many of its MPs and party officials -
has no interest in seriously addressing climate 
change and pursuing the kinds of smart energy 
policy that Saskatchewan needs to be at the 
forefront of. 
Ultimately though, the burden is on 
Saskatchewan’s NDP to make the case for 
why we (and social democratic economic 
principles) are much better at meeting the 
economic needs of people and communities 
than the Devine-Wall-Moe conservatives. We 
must walk the talk as we make our case, 
showing by plans and actions how we in 
government will both preserve and create good-
paying jobs as we move, over the next decades, 
to foster new energy sources and technology in 
ways that reduce our heavy economic reliance 
on oil and gas, while fighting for this industry’s 
and its workers’ rightful places in our national 
economy. 
We Recommend: 
(5.1) That we make it clear that we 
understand the importance of our resource 
industries for jobs, revenues and economic 
stability. Make it clear that it was the 
Saskatchewan NDP governments that laid the 
foundations of many of those jobs and we now 
want to see more value-added, more 
diversification, more innovation so that 
Saskatchewan stays ahead.  Make it clear that 
we are committed to strong, made-in-
Saskatchewan actions to both create new jobs 
and industries and to protect the climate, so that 
Canada meets the Paris emission reduction goals 
committed to by both of the last two Prime 
Ministers, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau.  
(5.2) That our Leader and our MLAs connect 
with those involved in the resource industries 
and build relationships and trust. First and 
foremost, this means connecting with those 
working in those industries. That includes the 
businesspeople grappling with the challenges of 
competition in the global economy and the 
nearby communities most involved in the 
environmentally - sustainable extraction, 
transportation and refining of Saskatchewan’s 
natural resources. 
(5.3) That we continue to reach out to those in 
the business community who are not locked 
into the cycle of inaction and short-term thinking 
that has led the SP to leave Saskatchewan well 
behind the curve.  We must continue to connect 
with workers in the energy and resource 
industries and their unions to strengthen 
communications and collaboration in pursuit of 
job creation as innovations, energy demands and 
product demand change, such as the ongoing 
shift from petroleum to more electricity. 
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(6) Our party needs to be 
rebuilt in rural 
Saskatchewan. 
We Recommend: 
(6.1) A renewed commitment to reconnecting 
with rural residents and communities based 
on active outreach, rebuilding constituency 
associations and renewed two-way 
communications to ensure rural Saskatchewan is 
a bigger part of all NDP strategies and actions. 
We believe the Agriculture and Rural Life 
Committee (ARC) has taken many strong 
actions to rebuild support and profile in rural 
constituencies.  These actions can be a key part 
of ongoing renewal and rebuilding with ARC, 
central bodies, our Leader and our MLAs 
working together on shared, coordinated rural 
initiatives. 
(6.2) Creation of a workable number of rural 
zones that group four to six constituencies 
together for mutual support, sharing of 
information and experiences, and collaboration 
on activities.  We suggest examining how each 
zone can be connected with an MLA and/or 
former MLA, who can work with them on an 
ongoing basis. 
(6.3) Regular zoom calls with rural 
constituency leaders and activists in each zone 
from central offices to strengthen two-way 
communications and information sharing. 
(6.4) Specific training and support for rural, 
grassroots communications so that the work of 
the Leader, the MLAs and the party can be more 
broadly and effectively promoted within rural 
communities. 
(6.5) Specific efforts to work with the variety 
of rural situations in applying 
recommendations made in this report: one size 
does not fit all constituencies. 
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(7) Voters want us to 
stand up for them, 
regardless of federal 
party politics. 
Under the leadership of Tommy Douglas, 
Woodrow Lloyd, Allan Blakeney, Roy 
Romanow and Lorne Calvert, Saskatchewan 
played an important leadership role in Canada --
and fought hard and effectively for 
Saskatchewan’s interests. 
That is not what Saskatchewan has been getting 
under the current government. Brad Wall and 
Scott Moe were and remain featherweights on 
the national scene, and Saskatchewan has been 
punching far below its weight under the current 
government. For fourteen years, Mr. Wall and 
Mr. Moe focused on media stunts during 
federal-provincial meetings and achieved 
nothing of note on any national file – until 
March 25, 2021. 
On that date, in response in part to a foolish, 
poorly argued reference case pursued by the 
“Saskatchewan Party” government, the Supreme 
Court upheld the federal government’s climate 
pricing system. The decision of the SP 
government not to present a viable made-in-
Saskatchewan emissions reduction regime led to 
the most significant loss of provincial control 
over natural resources since 1982, when Premier 
Blakeney and then-Deputy Premier Romanow 
obtained full provincial control of resources 
during negotiations over the Constitution and the 
Charter of Rights. 
That is a lot of damage to undo. 
We recommend: 
(7.1) These issues should be highlighted as 
part of our work holding the current government 
accountable for its weakness, corruption, and 
poor judgment. 
(7.2) The party should consider what a better-
led Saskatchewan government should be 
working for on the national stage and ask for 
a mandate for that agenda in the next 
election. 
(7.3) The “Saskatchewan Party” has tried to 
deflect attention from its record of failure on the 
national scene by attacking the federal NDP and 
suggesting that Saskatchewan New Democrats 
are somehow responsible for what the federal 
NDP does in the federal Parliament. This is an 
old game. The answer is to be frank in strong 
disagreement with the federal NDP when it is 
wrong on provincial issues – as, for example, 
Alberta NDP leader Rachel Notley does - and to 
not permit the current government to hide from 
its own record by criticizing opposition parties 
in Ottawa. 
(7.4) Our party’s federal affiliation was on 
the minds of, and of concern to, a number of 
the members who spoke to us. The federal 
party’s failure to argue its corner in 
Saskatchewan - similar in some ways to our own 
- is an important issue for Saskatchewan 
members to raise at federal meetings. How close 
an affiliation the Saskatchewan NDP wants with 
the federal party is an appropriate issue for 
members to debate at Provincial Council and 
Convention. 
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(8) We need to connect 
more with Indigenous 
Peoples and communities. 
To meet this challenge, we must develop 
deeper and long-term relationships with more 
Indigenous leaders, elders and communities 
to emphasize the relevance of provincial 
politics and to ask them to consider the NDP 
as a partner in getting their priorities 
addressed by the province as appropriate. We 
must focus on what is important to many 
Indigenous voters: a sincere relationship 
developed over time, and one that does not have 
us showing up only near elections. 
Any support from Indigenous voters needs to be 
earned support that convinces people that voting 
for the Saskatchewan NDP is meaningful and a 
legitimate strategic choice even for those 
Indigenous voters who believe, with good 
reason, that their primary nation-to-nation legal 
relationship is with the federal government. 
Overarching all of this, the NDP must listen to 
and learn from those willing to take the plunge 
to try to build trust — and develop serious, 
tangible plans for a fair partnership for when the 
NDP returns to government. 
We Recommend: 
(8.1) An immediate priority must be the hiring 
of an Indigenous organizer to ensure ongoing 
outreach and organization efforts in conjunction 
with the work of the Leader, MLAs, the 
Indigenous wing and local constituency 
associations. 
(8.2) There should be an effort to address those 
provincial services that would facilitate work 
with Indigenous communities on and off reserve 
including economic development, health care, 
infrastructure links, social services, and 
education and skills training.  Given the many 
ways in which provincial governments have 
impacts on Indigenous communities, it is also 
important to show where the federal government 
has abandoned many of its responsibilities to 
provinces. 
(8.3) The panel further suggests that the 
Saskatchewan NDP must not only walk the talk 
of partnership with Indigenous Peoples, 
communities, and leaders with respect to 
provincial services and laws but should give 
considerable thought to how the NDP — and an 
NDP government — can be Indigenous 
Peoples’ ally in fighting Ottawa for its 
continuing failures and for its buck-passing to 
the provincial governments. 
(8.4) Deeper and more meaningful relationship 
building between the Saskatchewan NDP and 
Indigenous communities and individuals must 
take very seriously the role of elders and 
knowledge-keepers. Leader to leader trust-
building between the NDP leader and 
community leaders is crucial and must be 
emphasized in the Leader’s ongoing priorities. 
(8.5) Ongoing and strengthened efforts to ensure 
our members and activists are properly 
prepared to support Indigenous people, 
including candidates for public offices, within 
the party and in our communities in the face of 
racism, bias, and other injustices. 
(8.6) As the Saskatchewan NDP addresses its 
relationships with Indigenous communities and 
as it makes itself more attractive to youth, 
special consideration should be given to 
facilitating and welcoming Indigenous youth 
to be core to the NDP as it evolves. The Panel 
was highly impressed by the thoughtfulness and 
leadership qualities of Indigenous youth, both 
First Nation and Metis, and from whom we 
heard a good number of insights. Indigenous 
youth are at the very heart of Saskatchewan’s 
future -- as bridge-builders, translators, 
advocates and activists and as people ‘simply’ 
making their way in life in ways that help us 
learn little by little how to embrace difference 
and common humanity in the same breath.  In 
this respect, the action taken by Tristen 
Durocher on the lawn of the Saskatchewan 
legislature and beyond is an uncommonly 
inspiring example of the power of Indigenous 
youth to help lead Saskatchewan forward in the 
decades to come. 
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(9) We need to 
strengthen relationships 
with culturally diverse 
communities. 
We Recommend: 
(9.1) A significant commitment to ongoing 
outreach activities by the Leader, MLAs and 
appropriate party bodies to build up 
relationships, gain greater knowledge of the 
specific experiences and concerns of newer 
citizens and Saskatchewan’s culturally diverse 
communities, increase our profile and organize 
targeted constituency campaigns that will help 
elect candidates, including from those 
communities.  We had a significant number of 
candidates in the 2020 team who were from 
culturally diverse communities and while none 
were elected, some came very close, and that 
growth and participation is a foundation for 
more progress. 
(9.2) More communications and organizing 
actions that are geared to students and youth 
within those communities in order to ensure 
participation in the broadest possible ways. 
(9.3) Clear recognition that, alongside 
immigration and a growing presence of cultural 
communities in Saskatchewan’s social fabric, 
several developments – including growing 
urbanization of Indigenous people and more 
political activism from Indigenous communities, 
amongst youth, and within many marginalized 
communities -- are changing Saskatchewan 
politics, and for the better, and that those 
changes sometimes spark some resistance and 
reactions. 
(9.4) As a party we have done many good things 
in this changing context. Now we need to do 
more to remove remaining attitudinal 
barriers, resistance to more inclusion, and 
even examples of racism from within our 
audiences of potential NDP voters (these were 
brought up in meetings and included incidents 
during election canvassing.) 
(9.5) Ensure that all our members and activists 
are properly recognizing, respecting, and 
welcoming new people of all backgrounds at all 
levels of the party. Local constituency leaders 
and provincial bodies’ leadership teams need to 
ensure genuine inclusion and involvement in all 
aspects of the work of the party, from the work 
of putting up campaign signs to nomination as 
candidates to constituencies’ leadership.  
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(10) We need to improve 
how we debate and 
generate policy and 
platforms. 
As we commented above, the party’s current 
policy-making process tends to discourage 
members and new recruits. The process that 
produces policy resolutions at convention is an 
awkward way to research, carefully consider, 
balance and frame policy proposals that will 
attract wide support in an election. Our policy 
resolution process is hard to participate in, often 
hard to listen to, and the results are not always 
helpful. In our findings, we also particularly 
noted members’ efforts to contribute to the 
election platform directly, which produced 
considerable frustration all around.  Drawing on 
this experience, it is crucial that the governance 
bodies of the party and the membership develop 
a productive understanding going forward. 
The challenge in connecting participatory 
internal democracy to general policy formation 
and more specific platform development must be 
squarely faced.  That challenge is to harness 
such participation in such a way that not only 
good policy emerges in advance of platform 
development, but also that, at election time, 
campaign communications connected to policy 
and platform are clear, focused, and take root 
with those open to voting NDP.  Ultimately, we 
must bear in mind that, if our communications 
with the broad public contain too many 
messages, none of them will get through – a 
problem that appears to have affected the 2020 
campaign. 
We recommend: 
(10.1) That the leader appoint four policy 
task forces, each co-chaired by a caucus 
member and a party activist. We suggest a task 
force on (a) jobs; (b) public services; (c) rural 
and northern development; and (d) the real 
record of the current government. 
(10.2) These task forces will consult widely, 
including with the party’s executive, wings and 
working committees; MLAs, former MLAs, and 
former candidates; riding association executives 
and members; our labour partners; business 
people; Indigenous communities and leaders; 
civil society; academics and issue experts; and 
municipal leaders and citizens. Our goal is to 
engage friends and supporters in open, 
collaborative, friendly, fact-based and results-
oriented discussions about these issues – a 
process that will inspire and engage people. 
(10.3) Consider building into the work of the 
task forces one or more collaborative-decision 
and digital-democracy tools in order to benefit 
from the collective insight of members, experts 
and stakeholders. 
(10.4) That task force reports be considered 
by the Executive, Council and Convention as 
priority policy discussions – and be reported 
out in final form as building blocks to our next 
election platform, and guides to our work in the 
Legislature and in outreach to communities. 
(10.5) Policy generated by task force 
processes and platform elements should be 
embedded in a communications strategy 
organized around clear core messages for wide 
audiences. However comprehensive the policy 
documents end up being, very deliberate choices 
must be made on what to emphasize in 
messaging. 
(10.6) After going through this exercise, the 
Executive and Council should consider whether 
it might provide a model for a fundamental 
reform of the convention policy resolution 
process. 
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(11) The candidate 
nomination process 
must be improved. 
We Recommend: 
(11.1) That the Election Planning Committee in 
early 2022 develop a strategy for nominations 
to consider timing with the goal that candidate 
nominations start 24 -18 months prior to the 
scheduled date of the 2024 election, with 
appropriate preparations and criteria in place 
prior to any nominations. 
(11.2) That criteria for nomination meeting 
approvals be adopted and include membership, 
fundraising and voter contact goals, and 
candidate search efforts (including diversity and 
equity goals), with those criteria taking account 
of the various categories of constituencies such 
as incumbent, ‘2020 near win’, rural, etc.  
(11.3) That sufficient resources be allocated 
for thorough vetting of prospective candidates 
for nominations and be sufficient to meet a 
robust turnaround time.  
(11.4) That the steering committee of the 
Election Planning Committee be responsible for 
the appointment of the candidate vetting staff 
and make known to all bodies within the party 
the Terms of Reference for the vetting process, 
as developed and approved by the Provincial 
Executive. 
(11.5) That a decision of the candidate vetting 
process may be appealed to the Officers of the 
party who shall make the final decision of 
approval/non-approval. 
(11.6) That a candidate search task force be 
appointed by the Election Planning Committee 
by January 2022 and work with the caucus, the 
wings of the party, affiliated trade unions, 
constituency associations and others who can 
actively support effective candidate search. 
(11.7) That Terms of Reference for the 
candidate search task force be made known to 
all bodies within the party when it is appointed. 
(11.8) That the Provincial Executive and/or the 
Election Planning Committee undertake 
significant internal communications directed 
to constituencies and their activists to ensure that 
they are aware of all aspects of the candidate 
nomination process. 
(11.9) That by July 2022 the Provincial 
Executive have in place appropriate rules and 
regulations to govern the conduct of 
nomination meetings, including but not limited 
to such questions as voter eligibility, mail-in 
ballots, multi-day voting, nomination campaign 
spending limits, nomination meeting 
management plans, identification requirements, 
notice periods, etc.  As well, these regulations 
should cover by-elections, snap elections and 
other situations that may require the waiving or 
alteration of standard nomination procedures. 
The Executive is to appoint a task force to 
develop this package of nomination meeting 
regulations. 
(11.10) That very serious consideration be given 
to a constitutional amendment or regulation to 
specify that members must be in good 
standing 60 or 45 days prior to the nominating 
meeting to be eligible to vote. That period would 
allow time for verification of the membership 
voter lists, for candidates to meet the members, 
and for preparation of a well-organized 
nomination meeting. 
(11.11) That preparations be made soon for 
the coming redistribution of constituencies, 
which will require collaboration between the 
provincial office and the constituency 
associations. 
(11.12) That provision be made for adequate 
resources, primarily staff and volunteer time, 
early in the coming cycle in order to execute a 
successful nomination strategy in all 61 
constituency associations.  
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(12) We must address 
the decline in turnout, 
particularly from within 
our voter base. 
In each of the last three elections, voter turnout 
has been very low in Saskatchewan: 51.1% 
(2011), 53.5% (2016), and 52.8% (2020).  This 
is a consistent and marked drop since the 60.8% 
turnout in 2007 when the NDP lost 
government. Given the extent of the voter 
discontent demonstrated in polls published at the 
time of the 2017 SP budget and associated 
cutbacks in services, we believe that greater 
citizen participation and mobilization is possible 
than the 2020 voter turnout.  (We also have to 
assume that COVID will not again be a factor 
keeping some of our supporters home in 2024.) 
The recent victories in Georgia and other US 
states like Arizona have vividly demonstrated 
the possibilities of expanded mobilization. 
Georgia leader Stacey Abrams would be the first 
to say that it ultimately took a cast of thousands, 
on doorsteps, on street corners, and online. Not 
just to reach out and advance-register Georgia 
non-voters and new voters, but also to win the 
turn-out war contest on election day, both in the 
presidential election and in the double Senatorial 
race two months later. That mobilization of 
thousands of volunteers is our challenge here as 
well. 
The successes in Georgia made it very clear that 
success in raising voter turnout is not possible 
with just 28-day efforts or with just a stellar 
GOTV effort alone – we need this approach for 
the next three and a half years and beyond.  All 
of the turnout issues connect back to ‘the 
permanent campaign’ model. 
We recommend: 
(12.1) Meaningful resources and energy must 
be devoted to analysis of low voter turnout, to 
development of ongoing long-term strategies 
to increase overall voter turnout and to the 
significant strengthening of our approach to Get-
Out-The-Vote (GOTV) operations during the 
2024 election. 
(12.2) We urge strong outreach, 
communications, voter contact and advocacy 
actions to connect more people in more of their 
communities to our positions, values and 
activities.  These initiatives - directed towards 
youth, Two-Spirited and LBGTQ communities, 
new Canadians, farmers, workers and small 
businesses in various sectors, Indigenous 
communities and persons, suburban 
neighbourhoods, and others - should all 
approach voter turnout as not just one outcome 
of more political engagement, but a critical one. 
(12.3) We urge an action-centred, relationship-
building approach across all outreach plans and 
activities. (See a number of recommendations 
that spell this general principle out in more 
concrete terms in different contexts). 
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(13) We must engage 
more youth in our party. 
We must make membership as meaningful as 
possible for all members, and some youth will 
join for that reason. But, more generally, it may 
not be productive to stick just to a membership 
model of engagement that is producing limited 
gains. 
Instead, develop a ‘no strings attached’ approach 
that will open doors to participation 
opportunities that can expand over time. 
Walk the talk on the issues that we know many 
youth open to the NDP are concerned about — 
including climate change, decent jobs, a fair 
future for them in a world of deepening 
economic inequality, decolonization and 
combating resurgent racism.  
We recommend: 
(13.1) We recommend above that The 
Commonwealth, “Coffee Row”, and a weekly 
party bulletin be relaunched using email, 
Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, and other 
appropriate online platforms. We suggest youth 
members -- in particular, members of the 
Youth Wing executive and team -- be invited 
to participate as core members of the team to 
help make this happen. 
(13.2) Develop more -- and more creative --
ways to draw young people to the party and 
our activities, including but not limited to 
membership.  Invite folks to meaningful days of 
action and events that can attract newcomers for 
the substance of what is being done and that do 
not feel like a sales pitch for joining the NDP. 
(13.3) At the same time, the party must increase 
traditional methods of expanding youth 
involvement: building up campus clubs, 
recruiting a critical mass of youth members in 
all communities and demographic sectors, 
training in organizational and communications 
roles, expanding the summer intern program, 
and standing up on the issues that most interest 
younger people. 
(13.4) Switch it up, too, as there is nothing 
wrong with making democracy a bit more 
fun, whether a Trivia night at a pub or a music 
night or a video-games tournament. As well, 
leader and MLA events can allow youth to 
engage in casual meet and greets and talk with 
the party’s elected representatives about their 
work, politics and issues of the day: 
conversations not just ‘meetings’. 
(13.5) Perhaps most crucially, if the party takes 
up our suggestion to consider digital 
democracy tools and platforms for collaborative 
engagement as part of the task-force policy 
process, put youth — they do not have to be 
members, that is part of our point — at the 
forefront of scouting, selecting, testing and, as 
possible, trialing good prospects with members. 
Here, it is worth noting that some of the best 
digital democracy platforms pay considerable 
attention, at the design level, to the element of 
enjoyable engagement when making choices and 
giving one’s input. 
(13.6) Go further. Enlist the ideas, tech savvy 
and energy of youth to drive the party into 
creative space. For example, consider 
challenging NDP youth to use their know-how 
to suggest ways in which the Saskatchewan 
NDP should think about becoming its own 
online broadcaster, generating serious content in 
a non-boring way. 
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(14) Our governance and 
campaign planning need 
reform. 
Our party’s core decision-making bodies 
need reform. 
We recommend: 
Overall governance improvement: 
(14.1) That the President work with members of 
the Provincial Executive, the members of the 
Provincial Council and senior staff to review 
and clarify ‘who does what’ in order to 
maximize efficient operations and clear 
decision- making responsibilities.  Particular 
attention should be given to the best use of 
Council meetings to maximize focus on political 
content and constituency development, rather 
than the operational and administrative issues 
being addressed by Officers and Executive.   
(14.2) That the President undertake new actions 
to strengthen the flow of information from 
Executive and Council meetings going to 
constituencies, affiliates and wings, including 
reports, motions, and decisions as appropriate. 
(14.3) Given that each constituency has two 
Council representatives, we recommend that the 
constitution be amended so that one of them is 
the constituency president. That way, the 
constituency ‘leader’ will be directly involved in 
the deliberations of the Council and be able to 
speak for her/his constituency positions.  This 
would make the Council a more efficient vehicle 
to provide constituencies with the information 
coming to the Council and decisions made by 
the Council.  We learned in our meetings that 
currently too much Council information is not 
reaching constituency executives and activists. 
Election planning improvement: 
Our party needs to become capable of 
conducting four-year, 365-days-a-year 
campaigns, which means the way we plan and 
organize for elections needs to change.  
Traditionally in the Saskatchewan NDP, 
elections are organized and overseen by a 
“political committee” of cabinet ministers 
working closely with the Provincial Executive. 
This often worked well (the party won twelve 
elections between 1944 and 2003), ensuring that 
our leader and caucus kept the election cycle in 
mind while doing their work in the Legislature 
and working in close partnership with the party. 
More recently we have imported an “election 
planning committee” model from other NDP 
sections. We have not won any elections under 
this model. 
We think we should go back to what has worked 
here, suitably updated to fit current political 
circumstances. 
We recommend: 
(14.4) That the (elected, widely representative 
and accountable) Provincial Executive, plus the 
steering committee outlined below be the 
Election Planning Committee (EPC). 
(14.5) That the leader appoint a steering 
committee and name a chair. We suggest the 
steering committee be composed of three 
MLAs, two other seasoned party activists (non-
staff) appointed on the basis of their campaign 
skills and experience, the party president, and 
the Leader as an ex-officio member. 
(14.6) That the Provincial Executive, acting in 
its EPC role, consider and approve the 
campaign budget and the election platform 
proposed by the steering committee. The 
Executive’s key role should be to ensure that all 
bodies represented on and by the Executive are 
engaged in, and have their views carefully 
considered, in the work of election planning and 
preparations. The chair of the steering 
committee should report on progress to the  
Executive at least monthly. 
(14.7) That the chair of the steering committee 
meet at least weekly with the Leader, and be 
charged to ensure perfect alignment on all 
matters between its work and the party leader. 
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The chair of the committee should also report 
at least monthly to caucus, to consult on 
strategic questions, and to ensure alignment 
between the caucus’ work and campaign plans. 
(14.8) That the Leader and President report to 
the Provincial Council and Convention on 
election plans. 
(14.9) That the steering committee should meet 
daily in the immediate run-up to a campaign and 
during a campaign. 
(14.10) The steering committee, subject to the 
approval and oversight of the executive 
should: 
a. commission and consider all polling and 
research; 
b. direct the drafting of the platform, ensuring 
the reports of policy task forces (see 
Recommendation 5) are consider in the 
drafting process and ensuring appropriate 
internal and external consultations during 
the process 
c. design, propose, and oversee the campaign 
budget; 
d. hire and direct the work of a full-time paid 
campaign director; 
e. consider regularly updated proposals and 
plans from the campaign director (and the 
party CEO as appropriate) on a campaign 
organization chart and budget; pre-campaign 
and campaign leader’s tour; a candidate 
recruitment, vetting and nomination plan; 
local organizing and campaign plans; a 
debate strategy; a close-of-the-campaign 
strategy; a paid and earned communications 
plan; and other appropriate work – and then 
hold the campaign director accountable for 
progress and results; and 
f. define the terms and conduct of an 
appropriate competitive process to retain 
campaign contractors; select a digital/paid 
media advertising provider and a polling 
firm for a fixed term not to exceed an 
election cycle; and consider renewals or 
change based on election results and 
outcomes. 
(14.11) We recommend everyone involved in 
this work take the following to heart: it is the 
duty of senior campaign and political staff to 
“speak truth to power” by fearlessly and 
candidly providing the steering committee and 
the full EPC with their best advice. Then it is 
their duty to diligently carry out and fully report 
progress on direction given by the committee. 
Non-elected staff are in advisory and staff roles. 
The steering committee must not delegate or 
abdicate its own role and responsibilities, 
which are essential to success. 
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(15) We need to expand 
and improve our 
fundraising. 
We Recommend: 
(15.1) A simpler revenue-sharing formula is 
needed, one that has incentives to reward 
individual constituencies’ efforts with fewer of 
the complexities that bring frustration and likely 
reduce revenues for all levels.  We suggest rapid 
assessment of the options by a special task force 
of experienced staff and activists, including a 
review of the formulae and recent experiences in 
other major sections of the party, and 
recommendations for changes. 
(15.2) Digital fundraising potential must be 
further assessed for increased growth beyond 
our existing members and donors, including 
examining all the methods and techniques used 
in other sections and by civic organizations that 
have successfully expanded this revenue stream, 
to ensure ongoing success with best practices 
and systems. 
(15.3) More support for, and coordination 
with, constituency fundraising is needed, 
including direct mail, events, and ‘direct ask’ 
activities. The panel believes that investments in 
central support for better and more regular local 
constituency efforts will be rewarded in both 
increased revenue and good will. 
(15.4) In planning and executing enhanced fund-
raising approaches, great care must be taken not 
to deepen the feelings of members that they 
receive too many requests to donate in 
comparison to other forms of communications. 
In that respect, enhanced fundraising must be 
pursued in parallel with improved and 
expanded political engagement with 
members. 
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(16) Should we change 
our brand? 
The panel frequently heard the suggestion that a 
name change could give the party a new start 
and new appeal.  The parallel was made with the 
changes undertaken after the debacle of the 
Devine period. 
While we recognize that the SP was successful 
with a new name and brand, we must remember 
that those changes were necessitated by the 
Grant Devine Conservative government’s string 
of criminal convictions, widespread corruption 
and total failure in its performance - they had no 
alternative but to change their name. We are not 
in that situation so the parallel does not apply at 
all. 
We Recommend: 
(16.1) That we strengthen our brand by 
“doing”, not saying. Explain our successful 
record of governing Saskatchewan.  Reconnect 
with communities and citizens through strong 
Opposition performance and active political 
work year-round.  Talk to more people more 
often about their priorities (not just ours).  Show 
confidence and pride in what we have 
accomplished and what we will accomplish -
that is the most powerful way to strengthen our 
brand. 
(16.2) That we remind people that we are the 
Saskatchewan NDP, with deeper roots in this 
province than the SP conservatives. 
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(17) Party wings and 
committees need 
support, clear mandates, 
and more involvement. 
The party has a number of constitutionally 
recognized entities that are often collectively 
called “wings”. [this sentence to be deleted] In 
our meetings it was clear that there is a wide 
range of perceptions, levels of activity and some 
confusion within the wings and committees. 
Clarity is required. 
We Recommend: 
(17.1) That the CEO and the President 
conduct a review of each wing and committee 
in conjunction with the leaders and other 
activists as appropriate to assess the situation of 
each. This review should provide 
recommendations to the Executive to guide 
revision of wing and committee mandates if 
necessary, review appropriate support and 
resources, and assess their roles in the party’s 
overall political strategies. 
(17.2) The review should also examine the 
relationships between the wings and 
committees and the Executive, Council, and 
caucus to determine if there are greater 
opportunities for the wings and committees to 
support the work of the party overall through 
those bodies. Determine if they feel they are 
being heard, if they know what the opportunities 
are for them, if they have ideas to support broad 
party and caucus strategies, and how they 
understand where they fit, or could fit, in the 
party processes. 
(17.3) In this review and subsequent actions 
concerning the wings and committees, the panel 
urges recognition of the important role played 
by some of the wings and committees in 
bringing new people into active party 
involvement, in recruiting and supporting 
candidates for public office, and in providing 
concrete support to their members and their 
sectors of the Saskatchewan population.  While 
this has historically been the case for the SNDW 
and the Young New Democrats, we feel there is 
the potential for more growth in these directions 
with the Agriculture and Rural Life, Rainbow 
Pride, Indigenous and Diversity bodies, given 
proper planning and support. 
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Part 4: Next Steps 
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Implementation: 
To generate some early momentum, we suggest 
the following be undertaken within 90 days. 
That is not to say that these are the top priorities, 
rather we see these as some that can be started 
up quickly even as the Leader, the CEO, the 
President and the appropriate party bodies work 
on the report as a whole. Many of our 
recommendations are much broader strategic 
steps and will be ongoing for years. 
We recommend: 
(1) We recommend the policy task forces 
proposed in recommendation 10.1 be appointed 
within 90 days, to get to work on policy renewal. 
(2) We recommend the EPC steering 
committee proposed in recommendation 14.5 
be appointed within 90 days to get to work on 
planning the next election. 
(3) We recommend that the nominations rules 
task force proposed in recommendation 11.9 be 
appointed within 90 days to get to work on 
modernizing nomination rules and procedures. 
(4) We recommend rural zones be created 
within 90 days as proposed in recommendation 
6.2, as a first step to getting to work renewing 
and rebuilding our party in rural Saskatchewan. 
(5) We recommend the Indigenous Organizer 
proposed in recommendation 8.1 be appointed 
immediately. 
(6) We recommend the Leader, the CEO and the 
President collaborate to provide a written 
report tracking progress on the 
implementation of the approved 
recommendations at each meeting of the 
Provincial Executive and the Provincial Council 
until the next election. 
Like those who met with us, we are eager 
to see the changes and forward progress 
that will lead to victory in 2024 and 
beyond. We will be available to discuss 
the report, our rationale for the contents 
and any background information. 
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Appendix A: 
Our panel 
Judy Bradley grew up on a family farm south 
of Regina, raised her family at Milestone and 
now resides at Echo Lake. She is a retired 
educator. Judy was elected as a Member of the 
Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan under 
Premier Romanow, representing Bengough -
Milestone from 1991 to 1995, and reelected for 
1995-1999 in the redistributed constituency of 
Weyburn-Big Muddy. During this time, she was 
Caucus Vice-Chairperson and served in cabinet, 
as Minister of Highways and Transportation and 
Minister Responsible for the Status of Women. 
Presently Judy is elected to the Prairie Valley 
School Board and serves as a Vice Chair. Judy is 
a dedicated lifetime member of the NDP. 
Modeste McKenzie is a 26-year-old Dene-
Metis man who was raised in northern 
Saskatchewan and currently resides in Prince 
Albert. He has served the Saskatchewan NDP in 
many different capacities but most recently as 
the Vice-President of the party. Currently, he 
attends the University of Regina and is a 
community activist that is passionate about 
Indigenous youth suicide prevention. 
Craig Scott, originally from small-town 
(Windsor) Nova Scotia, is Professor of Law at 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. 
He served as Member of Parliament for Toronto-
Danforth from 2012 to 2015 during which time 
he was Official Opposition Critic for 
Democratic and Parliamentary Reform and a 
proud member of the NDP’s (then-named) 
LGBTQ MP Caucus. Currently, Craig serves on 
the Panel of Senior Advisors to the Auditor 
General of Canada. He is also on the board of 
Ethelo Decisions, a British Columbia “B Corp” 
– at the same time as supporting digital-
democracy initiatives through the non-profit 
eDemocracy Network. 
Gerry Scott lives in Vancouver and has been 
active in the NDP since 1972. He served twice 
as Provincial Secretary of the BC NDP, once in 
the mid-1980s and again from 2003 to 2006. He 
has worked in the House of Commons, the BC 
Legislature and the Government of BC in a 
number of research, communications and 
strategic planning roles.  Gerry was the Climate 
Change Program Director at the David Suzuki 
Foundation from 1998 to 2003.  He has 
organized and managed many campaigns in 
several provinces (but regrettably not in 
Saskatchewan) and several of BC’s federal 
campaigns.  In recent years Gerry managed the 
2015 and 2019 Alberta campaigns, and was the 
director of multicultural communications and 
outreach in the 2017 and 2020 BC campaigns. 
Brian Topp served as chief of staff to Alberta 
premier Rachel Notley, deputy chief of staff and 
director of research to Saskatchewan Premier 
Roy Romanow, and as national campaign 
director to federal NDP leader Jack Layton. He 
is a member of the board of the Broadbent 
Institute, a fellow at the Public Policy Forum, 
and teaches a unit at McGill University’s Max 
Bell School of Public Policy. He is a partner at a 
public affairs consultancy in Toronto. 
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Appendix B: 
NDP vote by constituency 1978-2020 
2020 2016 2011 2007 2003 1999 1995 1991 1986 1982 1978 
N Athabasca 56.8% 64.7% 63.8% 59.4% 70.7% 84.4% 40.2% 83.8% 55.2% 39.2% 58.2% 
N Cumberland 66.5% 62.3% 63.2% 66.0% 69.0% 69.0% 74.4% 80.7% 60.7% 64.4% 59.2% 
Urb Moose Jaw North 34.1% 34.6% 35.9% 45.5% 57.9% 50.7% 67.0% 50.4% 37.6% 49.5% 
Urb Moose Jaw Palliser 58.4% 
Urb Moose Jaw South 58.5% 45.3% 59.1% 
Urb Moose Jaw Wakamow 41.1% 42.6% 45.9% 52.3% 62.6% 53.9% 63.0% 67.2% 
Urb Prince Albert 55.8% 44.0% 54.1% 
Urb Prince Albert Carlton 38.2% 41.2% 37.6% 48.6% 58.6% 54.0% 54.1% 59.7% 
Urb Prince Albert-Duck Lake 49.5% 41.9% 46.3% 
Urb Prince Albert Northcote 45.3% 49.1% 46.8% 53.3% 58.9% 48.6% 58.8% 68.0% 
Urb Regina Albert North 61.0% 
Urb Regina Churchill Downs 69.9% 
Urb Regina Centre 52.1% 63.2% 60.3% 52.3% 60.8% 
Urb Regina Coronation Park 44.1% 45.5% 44.0% 56.9% 62.9% 52.2% 63.5% 
Urb Regina Dewdney 35.0% 45.5% 55.1% 47.1% 69.3% 69.4% 
Urb Regina Douglas Park 60.1% 49.8% 41.3% 51.9% 57.0% 
Urb Regina Elphinstone-Ctr 59.9% 59.2% 57.1% 62.5% 66.4% 
Urb Regina Elphinstone 51.1% 67.1% 72.0% 70.9% 55.5% 70.4% 
Urb Regina Hillsdale 51.3% 
Urb Regina Lake Centre 62.8% 
Urb Regina Lakeview 65.5% 56.5% 48.4% 47.7% 56.9% 49.3% 54.9% 47.6% 42.2% 45.3% 
Urb Regina North 58.7% 37.9% 37.9% 
Urb Regina Northeast 44.2% 40.6% 38.7% 48.8% 61.3% 52.5% 64.2% 64.0% 38.5% 61.0% 
Urb Regina Northwest 58.7% 38.4% 54.9% 
Urb Regina Rosemont 57.9% 54.0% 54.9% 53.4% 62.1% 65.2% 55.8% 39.2% 60.8% 
Urb Regina Sherwood 50.6% 63.3% 
Urb Regina South 42.6% 41.2% 48.5% 39.0% 48.1% 37.8% 31.0% 38.3% 
Urb Regina University 50.0% 43.0% 
Urb Regina Victoria 47.6% 58.5% 65.3% 50.2% 42.6% 60.7% 
Urb Regina Walsh Acres 37.7% 42.7% 39.3% 62.0% 62.9% 
Urb Saskatoon Broadway 53.1% 
Urb Saskatoon Buena Vista 51.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Centre 58.5% 57.1% 54.0% 57.4% 61.9% 49.7% 42.9% 55.6% 
Urb Saskatoon Churchill-Wldd 46.2% 40.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Eastview 50.8% 41.0% 39.6% 45.4% 44.6% 43.5% 55.7% 38.9% 32.8% 46.7% 
Urb Saskatoon Eastview-Hltn 52.5% 
Urb Saskatoon Fairview 53.9% 39.7% 46.2% 51.3% 55.3% 56.7% 64.8% 66.6% 60.5% 34.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Greystone 37.9% 38.8% 49.2% 47.9% 43.1% 37.9% 
Urb Saskatoon Idylwyld 53.9% 62.8% 60.8% 
Urb Saskatoon Massey Place 53.9% 55.7% 61.4% 
Urb Saskatoon Meewasin 51.2% 43.0% 41.7% 35.3% 40.9% 44.2% 51.3% 
Urb Saskatoon Mount Royal 58.0% 63.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Nutana 65.1% 56.5% 49.6% 51.7% 55.5% 53.9% 64.8% 55.8% 59.5% 45.8% 57.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Riversdale 47.9% 48.2% 51.5% 56.1% 62.7% 57.9% 68.2% 70.9% 68.5% 47.0% 64.7% 
Urb Saskatoon Sutherland 34.6% 40.6% 58.9% 44.4% 49.1% 47.2% 34.1% 43.3% 
Urb Saskatoon Sutherland-Uni. 47.0% 
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Urb Saskatoon University 53.0% 42.6% 44.4% 41.2% 
Urb Saskatoon Westmount 65.3% 64.9% 46.4% 62.9% 
Urb Saskatoon Westview 41.0% 46.3% 
Sub Martensville-Warman 18.5% 17.1% 
Sub Regina Albert South 46.4% 
Sub Regina Gardiner Park 35.6% 34.4% 
Sub Regina Pasqua 44.7% 40.9% 
Sub Regina Qu'Appelle Valley 34.1% 40.6% 58.9% 49.2% 55.2% 
Sub Regina Rochdale 38.9% 36.4% 
Sub Regina Wascana 41.3% 34.8% 45.4% 
Sub Regina Wascana Plains 32.0% 27.1% 26.9% 31.3% 43.4% 40.2% 47.8% 46.4% 
Sub Saskatoon Mayfair 43.8% 32.0% 55.3% 
Sub Saskatoon Northwest 35.5% 29.1% 25.4% 29.7% 37.4% 34.3% 45.8% 
Sub Saskatoon River Heights 42.9% 
Sub Saskatoon Silverspring-Suth. 37.9% 28.5% 
Sub Saskatoon Siver Springs 21.6% 27.5% 39.0% 
Sub Saskatoon South 45.2% 38.1% 
Sub Saskatoon Southeast 34.5% 28.0% 19.3% 28.4% 29.6% 38.3% 49.0% 
Sub Saskatoon Stnbrdg-Dakota 28.1% 24.4% 
Sub Saskatoon Wildwood 43.2% 
Sub Saskatoon Willogrove 31.8% 24.0% 
N
W Battleford-Cut Knife 35.9% 40.9% 
N
W Biggar-Sask. Valley 15.2% 18.7% 
N
W Biggar 25.7% 30.8% 36.1% 47.6% 44.7% 38.5% 55.8% 
N
W Cut Knife-Lloydminster 47.6% 42.5% 43.8% 52.4% 
N
W Cut Knife-Turtleford 13.2% 13.3% 33.3% 31.5% 39.0% 
N
W Kindersley 7.2% 18.1% 16.1% 20.4% 22.1% 20.4% 24.5% 28.7% 28.8% 23.9% 34.3% 
N
W Lloydminster 11.4% 8.6% 29.1% 36.8% 48.0% 38.7% 43.7% 
N
W Martensville 13.5% 18.7% 28.9% 
N
W Meadow Lake 25.7% 22.9% 36.7% 48.4% 60.3% 46.7% 48.2% 51.3% 35.0% 31.5% 44.0% 
N
W North Battleford 37.2% 53.9% 
N
W Redberry 44.3% 41.9% 36.3% 49.4% 
N
W Redberry Lake 32.4% 43.0% 
N
W Rosetown-Elrose 15.9% 18.1% 16.0% 20.0% 27.1% 39.0% 34.6% 29.4% 29.4% 
N
W Rosetown-Biggar 33.6% 42.2% 
N
W Rosthern-Shellbrook 16.1% 19.5% 31.8% 35.5% 36.5% 
N
W Rosthern 26.7% 28.5% 32.5% 33.5% 20.3% 35.8% 
N
W The Battlefords 28.6% 31.9% 35.8% 43.8% 42.5% 58.8% 47.7% 36.4% 58.0% 
N
W Wilkie 34.0% 30.1% 26.8% 32.9% 
NE Arm River-Watrous 23.9% 28.7% 38.2% 
NE Batoche 27.8% 30.6% 30.3% 34.1% 36.3% 
NE Canora 49.9% 41.8% 42.8% 55.8% 
NE Canora-Pelly 24.0% 20.7% 27.0% 29.9% 37.8% 28.2% 39.8% 
NE Carrot River Valley 19.8% 20.4% 22.2% 33.2% 42.0% 39.8% 43.2% 
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NE Humboldt-Watrous 15.0% 20.4% 35.0% 41.4% 
NE Humboldt 23.2% 28.0% 39.9% 45.6% 44.8% 44.1% 54.9% 
NE Kelsey-Tisdale 51.6% 42.1% 33.6% 50.3% 
NE Kelvington-Wadena 17.8% 18.5% 18.4% 23.1% 31.4% 28.0% 41.7% 54.3% 44.0% 45.2% 51.7% 
NE Kinistino 50.3% 47.2% 45.4% 54.6% 
NE Melfort 15.8% 19.4% 24.7% 30.1% 38.3% 41.1% 37.6% 37.1% 49.0% 
NE Melfort-Tisdale 31.5% 38.2% 
NE Nipawin 45.3% 38.6% 35.7% 43.1% 
NE Pelly 59.6% 47.0% 48.1% 56.4% 
NE Quill Lakes 49.8% 50.8% 47.6% 53.6% 
NE Saskatchewan Rivers 27.7% 29.4% 31.2% 41.2% 47.7% 42.6% 47.4% 
NE Shellbrook 52.0% 
NE Shellbrook-Spiritwood 38.7% 42.9% 
NE Shellbrook-Torch River 53.7% 46.6% 38.9% 
NE Turtleford 50.0% 43.7% 41.3% 51.5% 
NE Watrous 38.9% 47.3% 
SW Arm River 15.7% 17.3% 25.0% 38.1% 32.1% 35.2% 30.7% 41.8% 
SW Assiniboia-Gravelbourg 35.9% 30.3% 33.7% 38.5% 
SW Bengough-Milestone 37.9% 35.1% 34.8% 42.6% 
SW Cypress Hills 9.5% 12.1% 12.4% 16.0% 20.8% 20.7% 25.3% 
SW Lumsden-Morse 18.0% 19.9% 
SW Maple Creek 30.9% 31.7% 28.8% 32.5% 
SW Morse 34.8% 33.6% 33.8% 38.0% 
SW Shaunavon 37.3% 42.7% 38.6% 38.0% 
SW Swift Current 19.8% 15.1% 16.5% 23.4% 38.6% 30.2% 42.7% 51.0% 43.2% 33.4% 41.9% 
SW Thunder Creek 17.5% 23.2% 30.9% 20.0% 30.9% 32.6% 26.4% 28.5% 47.6% 
SW Wood River 14.0% 12.3% 14.7% 17.3% 26.0% 20.5% 30.4% 
SE Cannington 8.7% 8.8% 14.8% 16.6% 21.7% 14.6% 24.0% 
SE Estevan 7.0% 9.1% 17.3% 18.8% 31.4% 19.5% 35.6% 36.3% 29.1% 31.8% 33.7% 
SE Indian Head Milestone 28.2% 24.3% 20.0% 27.5% 39.4% 28.6% 43.5% 
SE Indian Head-Wolseley 39.7% 26.1% 27.8% 33.2% 
SE Last Mountain-Touchwood 25.2% 22.9% 28.9% 30.9% 39.8% 36.0% 46.2% 48.6% 46.6% 45.0% 49.8% 
SE Melville-Saltcoats 17.6% 21.9% 24.5% 31.8% 32.2% 
SE Melville 25.1% 38.1% 45.9% 38.5% 39.1% 48.3% 
SE Moosomin 16.3% 14.5% 19.0% 21.4% 30.9% 20.5% 32.1% 39.7% 31.7% 30.2% 33.0% 
SE Qu'Appelle 43.8% 
SE Qu'Appelle-Lumsden 48.3% 39.9% 27.7% 
SE Saltcoats 25.1% 38.2% 52.5% 46.6% 44.9% 46.0% 
SE Souris-Cannington 28.5% 22.3% 22.6% 29.1% 
SE Weyburn 45.3% 36.9% 34.4% 44.3% 
SE Weyburn-Big Muddy 13.2% 16.1% 22.1% 25.2% 40.6% 35.0% 41.6% 
SE Yorkton 23.3% 22.7% 27.7% 37.5% 51.5% 41.0% 49.6% 60.0% 44.7% 38.6% 46.9% 
